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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal entered by Utah's Fifth Judicial 
District Court, St. George Department, Washington County. This Court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and Utah Code § 78A-3-
102(3)G). This Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals but recalled the case 
on November 20, 2015. 
I. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether ReconTrust Company, N.A., a national bank, had authority to exercise 
the power of sale in a non-judicial foreclosure sale for a property located in Utah 
where it was appointed as successor trustee under the deed of trust. 
Whether, if ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale for 
properties located in Utah, such a foreclosure sale is void if the defaulted borrower 
suffered no harm or prejudice in having a national bank exercise the power of sale 
instead of a Utah attorney or title insurance company, and the defaulted borrower 
failed to object until months after the sale. 
In reviewing whether dismissal of the unlawful-detainer claim was appropriate, 
the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness, according the trial court 
no particular deference." Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., Inc., 2007 UT App 406, ,I 14, 176 
P.3d 446 (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). The trial court's 
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See id. 
The issue of ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of sale was preserved in 
the Opposition to Samuel Adamson's Motion to Dismiss filed by Distressed Asset 
Solutions Fund, LLC ("Distressed Asset"). See R. 106-07. That issue also was the basis 
for the trial court's dismissal order. See R. 403. The issue of the validity of the sale 
{ 3 7083362; I} 
conducted by ReconTrust was preserved in Distressed Asset's Opposition to Adamson's 
Motion for a Declaratory Judgment. See R. 301-09; see also R. 402-19. 
DETERMINATIVE FEDERAL AND UTAH STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
12 U.S.C. § 92a -Trust powers 
[Section 92a(a) and (b) provide:] 
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency. 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to grant by Q 
special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or 
local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, 
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State 
banks, trust companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national 
banks are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is 
located. 
(b) Grant and exercise of powers deemed not in contravention of State or local law. 
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or all of 
the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such powers by national 
banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within the meaning 
of this section. 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7 -Multi-state fiduciary operations. 
(a) Acting in a fiduciary capacity in more than one state. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 
§ 92a and this section, a national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any state. If a 
{37083362;1 }2 
national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity in a particular state, the 
bank may act in the following specific capacities: 
(1) Any of the eight fiduciary capacities expressly listed in 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a), 
unless the state prohibits its own state banks, trust companies, and other corporations that 
compete with national banks in that state from acting in that capacity; and 
(2) Any other fiduciary capacity the state permits for its own state banks, trust 
companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks in that state. 
(b) Serving customers in other states. While acting in a fiduciary capacity in one 
state, a national bank may market its fiduciary services to, and act as fiduciary for, 
customers located in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relationships that include 
property located in other states. The bank may use a trust representative office for this 
purpose. 
( c) Offices in more than one state. A national bank with fiduciary powers may 
establish trust offices or trust representative offices in any state. 
(d) Determination of the state referred to in 12 USC. § 92a. For each :fiduciary 
relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity for that relationship. A national bank acts in a fiduciary capacity in the 
state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, executes the documents that create the 
fiduciary relationship, and makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or 
distribution of fiduciary assets. If these activities take place in more than one state, then 
the state in which the bank acts in a :fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the 
state that the bank designates from among those states. 
{37083362;1 }3 
(e) Application of state law-(]) State laws used in section 92a. The state laws 
that apply to a national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C.§ 92a are the 
laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity. 
(2) Other state laws. Except for the state laws made applicable to national banks 
by virtue of 12 U.S.C.§ 92a, state laws limiting or establishing preconditions on the 
exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national banks. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-802.5 - Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale. 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful detainer 
if the person: 
(I) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a 
trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and 
(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being 
served with a notice to quit by the purchaser. 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-21-Trustees of trust deeds -Qualifications. 
[Sections (l)(a) and (3) provide:] 
(1) 
(a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within the state 
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff the obligation 
secured by the trust deed; 
{37083362;1 }4 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both the trust deed 
and by law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust deed; or 
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the purchase of the 
property secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance company 
authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah under the laws of 
Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually conducting a 
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 3 lA, Insurance Code, to 
conduct insurance business in the state; 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state. 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm 
Credit Administration or its successor. 
* * * * 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised by the trustee 
of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
{37083362;1 }5 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-23-Sale of trust property- Power of trustee - Foreclosure 
of trust deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsections 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is given the 
power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust property to be sold in 
the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a breach of an obligation for 
which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a 
trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee without 
express provision for it in the trust deed. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-23.5 - Civil liability for unauthorized person who exercises 
power of sale 
(I) As used in this section: 
(2) 
(a) "Unauthorized person" means a person who does not qualify as a trustee under 
Subsection 57-l-21(l)(a)(i) or (iv). 
(b) "Unauthorized sale" means the exercise of a power of sale by an unauthorized 
person. 
(a) An unauthorized person who conducts an unauthorized sale is liable to the trustor 
for the actual damages suffered by the trustor as a result of the unauthorized sale 
or $2,000, whichever is greater. 
(b) In an action under Subsection (2)(a), the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff the 
plaintiff's costs and attorney fees. 
{3 7083362; I} 6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves ReconTrust's authority, as appointed successor trustee under 
a deed of trust, to exercise the power of sale in a non-judicial foreclosure sale for 
properties located in Utah-and, if it lacks that power, the validity of a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale of Utah property that it conducts, as well as the resulting trustee's deed. 
On February 7, 2014, a bona fide purchaser of the property, Distressed Asset, filed 
~ an unlawful-detainer action against the occupants, Samuel and Courtney Adamson, in 
Utah's Fifth Judicial District Court, St. George Department, Washington County. See R. 
1-6. At a bench trial on August 7, 2014, Distressed Asset presented evidence that it 
obtained the property through a quitclaim deed executed by Bank of America, N.A. 
("BANA"), and that BANA acquired the property through a trustee's sale conducted by 
ReconTrust, a national bank. See Trial Exs. 1-3; Trial Tr. 20:1-17. Distressed Asset 
also presented a stipulated order wherein the parties agreed that the Adamsons remained 
in possession of the property since the sale, and that they continued to remain in 
possession of the property after receiving notices to quit. See R. 371-72 (stipulated 
order); Trial Tr. 20:24-21 :7. After Distressed Asset rested its case, the trial judge 
,·:., ~ 
concluded that the documents admitted into evidence "make out a prima facie case for 
unlawful detainer." Trial Tr. 21 :23-25; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-802.5. 
During the Adamsons' case-in-chief, Samuel Adamson testified that before the 
sale date, he received a copy of the notice of default and election to sell executed by 
ReconTrust, but he did not call or otherwise contact ReconTrust before the sale regarding 
the notice. See Trial Tr. 27:10-17, 29:1-5, 32:25-33:13. Specifically, they did not 
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attempt to contact ReconTrust before the sale, did not seek an injunction to stop the sale, 
and did not attend the sale, all despite being aware that the sale was scheduled. See Trial 
Tr. 29:1-33:13. The Adamsons presented no evidence that they were prejudiced by 
having ReconTrust exercise the power of sale instead of a Utah attorney or title insurance 
company. 
On September 2, 2014, the trial court dismissed the case, holding that Distressed 
Asset was unable to "overcome Defendants' defense that there has been no 'disposition 
of the property by the trustee's sale"' conducted by ReconTrust. See R. 419. The court 
concluded that because Federal National Mortgage Ass 'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 311 
P.3d 1004, held that ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale, the sale 
conducted by ReconTrust was void. See R. 404, 410-12. The court entered a final 
appealable order on September 2, 2014, see R. 434-35, and Distressed Asset noted its 
appeal, see R. 421-22. 
BANA purchased the property from Distressed Asset on January 6, 2015, and filed 
a motion to substitute BANA for Distressed Asset as appellant in this case. The Court of 
Appeals granted that motion. 
This Court recalled the case from the Court of Appeals after that court held oral 
argument, but before it issued an opinion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2007, Samuel Adamson financed the purchase of property located at 70 West 
Orchard Lane, Washington, Utah 84780 ("the property"). See R. 2; Trial Tr. 24:11-12. 
{37083362;1}8 
He executed a deed of trust granting Guild Mortgage Company a secured interest in the 
property that same day. See R. 2; Trial Tr. 25: 16-21; Trial Ex. 4. 
The trial court record reflects that Adamson subsequently defaulted on the note 
and has not made any loan payments since 2008. See R. 415 n.7; Trial Tr. 39:3-9. 
ReconTrust was appointed substitute trustee under the deed of trust. See R. 8-9; Add. at 
A-38. 1 As a result of the default, ReconTrust executed and properly recorded a notice of 
~ default and election to sell. See R. 2; Trial Ex. 1. In January 2010, the property was sold 
at a non-judicial foreclosure sale to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC-HLS"), 
FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP for the sum of $278,530.03. See Trial Ex. 
2. 
Although Adamson had received prior notice of the sale date, see Trial Tr. 32:21-
33:13, he never tried to contact ReconTrust before the scheduled sale date, see Trial Tr. 
29:1-15. He also did not attend the scheduled sale. See Trial Tr. 30: 14-17. 
ReconTrust executed and properly recorded a trustee's deed after the trustee's 
sale. See Trial Ex. 2. Since the sale, the Adamsons have continued to occupy the 
This Court may take judicial notice of the recorded substitution of trustee. See 
McGarry v. Thompson, 201 P.2d 288,291 (Utah 1948). 
{37083362;1} 9 
property, have failed to pay taxes on the property, and have not recorded a lis pen dens 
against the property. See R. 5, 371-72; Trial Tr. 37:20-24.2 
BANA, as successor by merger to BAC-HLS, transferred title to Distressed Asset 
via a quitclaim deed. See Trial Ex. 3. Distressed Asset provided consideration for the 
property without notice of any claims to the property. See R. 3; Trial Ex. 3. In 2014, 
Distressed Asset served a notice to quit on the Adamsons, notifying them that it had 
elected to terminate their tenancy at will and that failure to vacate within five days would 
result in the filing of an unlawful detainer action. See R. 15-21, 3 71-72. The A damsons 
failed to vacate the property. See R. 5, 371-72. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ReconTrust has the authority to exercise the power of sale for properties in Utah, 
based on 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7. This Court's decision to the contrary in 
Sundquist was wrongly decided and should be overruled. 
Even if Sundquist is not overruled, the trial court erred in concluding that the non-
judicial foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed executed by ReconTrust are void. 
The court's decision is premised on case law that is inapplicable to these facts and a 
treatise that conflicts with Utah law. Prior decisions from this Court make clear that the 
2 Ten months after the foreclosure sale, Samuel Adamson filed a putative class 
action against ReconTrust in federal court to challenge ReconTrust's authority to exercise 
the power of sale. See R. 107; Trial Tr. 36:9-25; Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., Jf.A., No. 
2: 10-cv-1099 (D. Utah). That lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice because the plaintiffs 
failed to comply with a show-cause order requiring the plaintiffs to provide the court with 
a status of the case after months of delay, and with their intentions to proceed. See Order, 
Coleman v. ReconTrust Co., NA., No. 2:10-cv-1099 (D. Utah Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 
142. 
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Adamsons cannot have the foreclosure sale set aside without proof that their interests in 
the property were sacrificed or there were unjust extremes from any violation of the Trust 
Deed Act. The Adamsons offered no such evidence. Moreover, they are precluded from 
even challenging the validity of the sale because they failed to object to ReconTrust's 
authority until months after the sale occurred. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
dismissal of Distressed Asset's unlawful detainer action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Sundquist Was Wrongly Decided And Should Be Overruled. 
The trial court relied on this Court's decision in Federal National Mortgage Ass 'n 
v. Sundquist that ReconTrust lacked authority to exercise the power of sale for properties 
in Utah because federal law does not preempt Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23. But 
Sundquist conflicts with the conclusions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, the federal Office of Comptroller of the Currency ("the OCC"), and the 
U.S. Solicitor General, all of which have stated that 12 U.S.C. § 92a and its implementing 
regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, preempt Utah Code §§ 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 and authorize 
ReconTrust to exercise the power of sale for properties located in Utah. See Garrett v. 
ReconTrust Co., 546 F. App'x 736 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion); OCC's 
Amicus Brief, Dutcher v. Matheson, No. 12-4150 (10th Cir. July 15, 2013) (Add. at A-39 
to -63); U.S. Solicitor General's Amicus Brief, Fed. Nat'! Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, No. 
13-852 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2014) (Add. at A-64 to -92). 
As these authorities explained, Section 92a states that, "when not in contravention 
of state or local law," a national bank may exercise fiduciary powers that are granted to 
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state banks, trust companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks 
"under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). 
Section 9.7(d) of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations clarifies that "the state 
referred to in section 92a," i.e., the state where the national bank is "located," is the state 
where a bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity." The regulation further defines the state in 
which the bank "acts in a fiduciary capacity" as the state in which the bank conducts 
three activities with respect to the specific fiduciary relationship at issue. 
The OCC and Solicitor General both noted that Section 9. 7 is a reasonable 
interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a. See Add. at A-57; Add. at A-82 to -83. Applying 
Section 9. 7, the Tenth Circuit, the OCC, and the Solicitor General interpreted that 
provision as allowing ReconTrust to exercise the power of sale on properties located in 
Utah because ReconTrust is located in Texas, and Texas law allows ReconTrust to 
exercise that power. See Garrett, 546 F. App'x at 740-42; Add. at A-52 to -58; Add. at 
A-81 to -85. Indeed, the Solicitor General specifically noted that Sundquist was 
incorrect. See Add. at A-81 ("The Utah Supreme Court held that, at least in cases 
involving the sale of real property, the national bank's authority to perform trust 
functions must instead be determined under the law of the State where the property is 
located. That holding is incorrect."). 
Given these significant legal developments, this Court should overrule Sundquist, 
recognize that federal law preempts Utah law regarding a national bank's authority to 
exercise the power of sale, and affinn ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of 
sale for the foreclosed property in this case. 
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II. The Trial Court Applied The Wrong Test When It Declared The Trustee's 
Deed Void. 
Even if this Court does not overrule Sundquist, it should still hold that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the unlawful-detainer action because the trustee's deed issued 
by ReconTrust is valid. As further explained in Part II.B below, Utah's jurisprudence has 
long held that a debtor must meet a high threshold to set aside a foreclosure sale based on 
a violation of the Trust Deed Act. See Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 
P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). Beginning with Concepts, this Court has held that "[a] sale 
once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there 
was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing" and the process "reach[ ed] unjust extremes." 
Id. at 1159-60. This high bar for setting aside a foreclosure sale was reaffirmed by this 
Court in Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,I 36, 86 P.3d 699, and has been consistently 
applied in Utah appellate court cases, including a case involving a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale conducted by a person who had not even been appointed trustee, see 
Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 1if 14-15, 285 P.3d 7. Rather than applying this 
line of cases, which squarely address the impact of violations of the Trust Deed Act, the 
~ trial court relied on (I) a case that predates the Utah Trust Deed Act and another that 
focused primarily on the Condominium Ownership Act, and (2) a real estate treatise that 
conflicts with Utah law. 
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A. The Trial Court Relied On Case Law And A Secondary Source That 
Do Not Apply In This Case. 
1. Singer Is Inapplicable. 
This Court has decided no cases that support the Adamsons' position that the 
trustee's deed is void, whereas this Court's decision in Concepts directly answers the 
question in this case. See infra Part II.B. The trial court mistakenly relied on Singer 
Manufacturing Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 (1880), a 135-year-old case that pre-dates 
the Utah Trust Deed Act and Utah statehood itself. As an initial matter, the trial court 
erred in treating Singer as binding precedent. Singer was decided by the Utah Territorial 
Supreme Court-not, as the trial court stated, by the Utah Supreme Court. See R. 405, 
411-12. And the Utah Territory derived its authority from Congress, whereas the State 
of Utah derives its authority from the people of Utah. See State ex rel. Bishop v. 
McNally, 43 P. 920, 920 (Utah 1896). Decisions of a court instituted by one sovereign 
are not binding on courts of a different sovereign. Cf Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.W.2d 819, 
825 (N.D. 1968) (noting that an issue was "a matter of first impression in this state since 
statehood" and treating a decision from the territorial court as only persuasive authority). 
Even if Singer were binding, it still would not apply here because of important 
factual differences between that case and this one. In Singer, a sheriffs sale was 
declared invalid because the auctioneer who cried the sale was not the appointed trustee 
and was not authorized to act as trustee under the deed of trust. See 2 Utah at 54 7. In 
other words, tlie auctioneer of the sale had no legal relationship and owed no duties to the 
trustee, trustor, or beneficiary of the deed of trust and had no reason to believe he could 
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sell the property. In contrast, ReconTrust was duly appointed by the beneficiary under 
the deed of trust to act as successor trustee. See Add. at A-38. It was qualified under 
Utah statutes to serve as a trustee because it is authorized by federal law to conduct trust 
business and conducted trust business in Utah. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-21(l)(a)(iii) 
( explaining that a qualified trustee includes "any corporation authorized to conduct a trust 
business and actually conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
~ United States").3 As trustee, ReconTrust owed legal duties to both the Adamsons and the 
beneficiary of the trust deed, ivffiRS. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P .2d 298, 302 
(Utah 1978). It also held legal title to the property by virtue of its status as trustee. See 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429,432 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-19(4)). Even if ReconTrust exceeded its statutory authority by 
conveying that title, such an ultra vires act would not be void unless it violated public 
policy. See Millard Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank of Millard Cty., 14 P .2d 967, 971-72 
3 Although this Court held in Sundquist that ReconTrust lacked the power of sale, 
ReconTrust is still a qualified trustee under Utah Code§ 57-l-21(1)(a)(iii) because it is a 
corporation authorized to conduct trust business and actually conducting such business 
under the laws of the United States. The Adamsons' counsel conceded below that 
ReconTrust was authorized by Utah law to conduct certain trustee activities such as 
executing the notice of default, without exercising the power of sale. See Trial Tr. 73 :5-
11. 
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(Utah 1932) (holding that a bank's ultra vires act did not render securities void).4 Given 
this critical factual distinction, Singer does not apply here. 
Further, because Singer did not involve a violation of the Trust Deed Act (which 
was adopted approximately eighty years after Singer), the debtors there did not need to 
establish the heightened level of proof that applied in Concepts. The Adamsons, 
however, rely exclusively on ReconTrust's alleged vjolation of the Trust Deed Act to 
have the sale here set aside. They thus must prove that their interests were "sacrificed or 
there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160 
(emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B. There was no such showing in this case. See 
infra Part III. 
In Singer, moreover, there are no facts suggesting that the debtors had prior notice 
of the auctioneer's identity because the appointed trustee was someone other than the 
auctioneer. Without such prior notice, the debtors did not have the opportunity to object 
to the auctioneer's authority to conduct the sale. See Singer, 2 Utah at 547. Therefore, 
there was no remedy available to the debtors other than seeking to have the sale set aside 
after it occurred. The Adamsons, in contrast, were afforded prior written notice, through 
the notice of default and election to sell, that ReconTrust would conduct the sale. See 
Trial Tr. 27:10-17; 32:25-33:13 (Samuel Adamson testifying that the notice of default 
4 The public policy of requiring a trustee who exercises the power of sale to be 
physically present in Utah seeks to make it easier for borrowers to meet with the trustee 
before a foreclosure sale occurs. That policy could not have been violated in this case 
when the borrower did not even attempt to contact the trustee. See infra Part II.B.3 
(discussing this purpose); supra Statement of Facts (noting that the Adamsons never 
attempted to contact ReconTrust). 
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was taped to his door before the sale date); Trial Ex. 1; see also Reynolds, 2012 UT App 
206, ~ 15 ( explaining that the notice of default "inform[ s] persons with an interest in the 
property of the pending sale of that property, so that they may act to protect those 
interests" (quoting Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159)). Therefore, unlike the debtors in Singer, 
there is evidence that the Adamsons had an opportunity to object to the sale before it 
occurred. 
2. McQueen Is Also Inapplicable. 
The trial court also erred in relying on McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes 
Owners Ass'n, 2013 UT App 53, 298 P.3d 666, because that case is also factually 
distinguishable. 
First, McQueen was about the Condominium Ownership Act's requirements for 
non-judicial foreclosures of assessment liens. In fact, the court twice defined the issue on 
appeal to be the extent to which portions of the Trust Deed Act were incorporated into the 
Condominium Ownership Act given the latter Act's requirement that "a lien for 
nonpayment of a condominium unit assessment may be enforced through foreclosure or 
sale according to the law of deeds of trust or mortgages." McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, ,r 
9. The court specifically considered whether the Trust Deed Act's requirement that a 
trustee be appointed should also apply to a condominium unit assessment-lien 
foreclosure. See id. ,r,I 11, 15. And in the context of such a foreclosure, the court 
determined that the sale was invalid without an appointed trustee. See id. iJ 21. The court 
improperly went beyond the limited issue presented regarding the applicability of 
portions of the Trust Deed Act and instead decided the validity of the sale. Compare id. 
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121, with id. ,~ 9, 10. Further, the court did not address the impact of violating the Trust 
Deed Act .in a trust-deed foreclosure and therefore did not even mention, analyze, or 
distinguish Concepts or its progeny. It did not address specifically whether the lack of an 
appointed trustee of a trust deed would invalidate a trust-deed foreclosure, and no 
subsequent appellate court case has applied McQueen in such a manner. 
Second, McQueen involved a sale that was declared invalid because, unlike the 
sale in this case, it was conducted by a person who was never appointed trustee and who 
served as the attorney for the entity conducting the sale. See id. ,r,r 20-21. 5 Indeed, the 
McQueen court's brief discussion of why the sale in that case was void turned entirely on 
the fact that no trustee at all had been appointed. See id. The McQueen court 
emphasized the importance of having an "independent third party who c[ ould] 
objectively execute [the] foreclosure" and fulfill the duties owed to the debtor/trustor, 
given that non-judicial foreclosures are conducted "in the absence of judicial oversight" 
and "without judicial intervention." Id. 'IT 21. Lack of an independent trustee could, for 
example, lead to an inadequate sale price at the trustee's sale, as happened in McQueen, 
when the condo sold for a mere $3,312.76. See id. CU 3. Here, by contrast, ReconTrust 
was properly appointed by the beneficiary to serve as the substitute trustee. See Add. at 
A-38. And there is no evidence in the record that ReconTrust was not independent or 
that it failed to fulfill its duties owed to the Adamsons when it conducted the sale. Unlike 
5 In fact, the attorney who conducted the sale was the attorney who argued the case 
in the Court of Appeals-meaning that that person was far from an "independent third 
party." McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass'n, 2013 UT App 53, ,r 21, 
298 P .3d 666. 
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the attorney in McQueen, ReconTrust's role as trustee did not result in an inadequate sale 
price, as the property sold for $278,530.03-almost $23,000 more than the amount 
borrowed to purchase the property. See Trial Ex. 2; Add. at A-20. 
Third, the McQueen opinion did not cite or appear to take into consideration this 
Court's ruling in Concepts, nor any other cases that followed Concepts. And as the trial 
court recognized, see R. 406, McQueen is in tension with Reynolds (which relied on 
Concepts), an earlier decision that the McQueen panel had no authority to overrule. See, 
e.g., J. W. v. State, 2005 UT App 382, ,r 10, 122 P.3d 679 (discussing stare decisis). 
Fourth, in McQueen the appointment of a trustee was a "n~cessary pre-requisite" 
to be able to convey the property in trust, as required by the Condominium Ownership 
Act. See McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, ,r,I 30-31 (Voros, J., concurring). A trust deed like 
the one in this case, however, conveys title to the property to a trustee as soon as the trust 
deed is executed. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-19(3) (providing that a trust deed 
"convey[ s] real property to a trustee in trust"); id. § 57-1-19( 4) ( defining a trustee as a 
"person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed"). In other words, the 
"necessary prerequisite" to "convey[ing] . . . the property in trust" in the trust-deed 
context occurs as soon as the trust deed is executed and not when a trustee is appointed. 
See McQueen, 2013 UT App 53, ,r 31. Therefore, McQueen's holding as to the 
importance of appointing a trustee in the assessment-lien context should not be applied t.o 
the appointment of a substitute trustee in the trust-deed context. 
Finally, McQueen' s holding should not apply here because it would represent a 
significant change in the common law regarding voiding non-judicial foreclosure sales 
{37083362;1} 19 
and the resulting trustee's deeds. Such changes are not automatically retroactive, and this 
Court has held that they will not be applied retroactively when the "overruled law has 
been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation creates a burden." Exxon 
C01p. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2010 UT 16,, 7, 228 P.3d 1246 (quoting Loyal Order 
of Moose, # 259 v. Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982)). Given the 
federal authority on which ReconTrust relied in good faith to exercise the power of sale, 
see infra Part II.B.3 (citing cases and other authorities), applying McQueen retroactively 
to undo the sale and hold any subsequent deed invalid would be not only burdensome to 
original owners, subsequent purchasers (including bona fide purchasers), and Utah 
county recorders, but also unfair and detrimental to a well-ordered system of land 
ownership, see infi--a Part II.B.2 ( explaining the importance of requiring a debtor to meet 
a high bar to set aside a sale). 
In the Court of Appeals, the Adamsons argued that McQueen created a three-part 
test for determining the validity of a trustee's deed: "1) creation of a trust relationship; 2) 
a qualified trustee; and 3) the adherence to correct procedural requirements." Appellees' 
COA Br. 11. Utah courts have never adopted such a test. The three-part test that the 
Adamsons posit for determining whether a deed is void evidently rests on the following 
language from McQueen: "The Trust Deed Act, in addition to other procedural 
requirements like proper notice, requires the creation of a trust relationship and the 
appointment of a qualified trustee." 2013 UT App 53, iJ 11. But nothing in this sentence 
refers to the validity of the foreclosure sale, i.e., McQueen does not address the 
consequences for failing to comply with the requirements that the sentence lays out. 
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Even if McQueen did provide a three-part test, ReconTrust meets all three parts. 
The Adamsons do not contest that a trust relationship was created. See Appellees' COA 
Br. 1 I. And ReconTrust was a qualified trustee under § 57-l-2l(l)(a)(iii), even if it 
lacked the power of sale under § 57-1-23. See supra note 3. As to the third prong, the 
Adamsons claimed that a deed is voidable if a debtor proves that his interests were 
sacrificed by a trustee's violation of a procedural requirement in the Utah Trust Deed 
~ Act. See Appellees' COA Br. 16. They stated in conclusory fashion that ReconTrust 
"ignored [their] rights and interests as trustors, and that [they] were not treated fairly." 
Appellees' COA Br. 12. As explained further below, however, no evidence in the record 
supports this assertion. See infi"a Part III. 
3. The Real Estate Finance Treatise Conflicts With Utah Law, And 
The Trial Court Misapplied It. 
The trial court also relied improperly on a real estate finance treatise that conflicts 
with Utah law concerning void and voidable deeds. Specifically, the court relied on 
language in the treatise that a void defect occurs when "someone other than the named 
trustee conducts the sale, including a successor who has not been validly appointed," 
\ifJ whereas a voidable error is "an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale and 
must be substantial or result in a probable unfairness." R. 408 (quoting Grant S. Nelson, 
Dale A. Whitman, et al., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW§ 7:21 at 953-57 (6th ed. 2014)). 
The trial court posited that "Singer clearly takes its place in the first category [ of void 
deeds], and the prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and 
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Reynolds are seen to be applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering 
a sale voidable rather than void." R. 409. This analysis is incorrect. 
As an initial matter, the treatise's definition of a void deed conflicts with Utah law. 
It fails to include Utah law's requirement that a deed must offend public policy or harm 
the public to be deemed void. See Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, 119, 189 P.3d 51. 
Indeed, there are no known Utah appellate cases that have adopted the treatise's 
definition of void and voidable. Put simply, the treatise should not have played any role 
in the trial court's ruling. See Gildea v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 2015 UT 11, 1122-23, 
347 P.3d 385 (refusing to adopt a property treatise that conflicted with Utah law). 
Moreover, even if the treatise were consistent with Utah law, the trial court erred 
in concluding that the sale conducted by ReconTrust fit within the treatise's definition of 
a void sale. Again, the treatise states that a sale is void "when someone other than the 
named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor who has not been validly 
appointed." R. 408 ( citation omitted). ReconTrust, however, conducted the sale after it 
was validly appointed as trustee-facts that the Adamsons did not dispute at trial. 
Therefore, the sale conducted by ReconTrust does not fit within the treatise's definition 
of a void sale. 
B. Concepts And Its Progeny Provide The Rule For This Case. 
The proper test for determining whether a foreclosure sale should be set aside was 
established by this Court in Concepts and later applied in Utah appellate court cases. 
That rule is not only well established, but also well reasoned. 
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1. This State Has Long Required A Debtor To Meet A High Bar. 
This Court has established a high standard for setting aside a foreclosure sale, 
explaining that "[t]he remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which 
reach unjust extremes." Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ,r 36 (citing Concepts, 743 P.2d 
at 1159). A foreclosure sale is presumed valid and will not be set aside unless the debtor 
proves that "the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud 
~ or unfair dealing." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160 (emphasis omitted). Explaining this rule 
further, the Court of Appeals noted that "substantial inadequacy of price, coupled with 
fraud, mistake, or other unfair dealing can be the basis for setting aside a foreclosure 
sale." Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting First Nat'! 
Bank v. Haymond, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (Utah 1936)). Indeed, this Court has recognized 
that a contract, such as a deed, is void ab initio only when it "offend[ s] public policy or 
harm[s] the public." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,r 19. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in Reynolds v. Woodall illustrates this rule; that 
case involved facts similar to this case, in that the person who conducted the sale had 
"questionable authority" to do so, as the trial court acknowledged. R. 405. Based on this 
Court's decisions in Concepts and Timm, Reynolds affirmed a trial court's decision that a 
trustee's sale was valid even though the sale was conducted without a properly appointed 
trustee. See 2012 UT App 206, ,r 18. Of particular importance here, the Court of 
Appeals recognized the importance of a debtor acting to protect his interests in the 
property before the non-judicial foreclosure sale occurs. The individual who recorded the 
notice of default and election to sell, and who exercised the power of sale, did so before 
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the beneficiary executed and recorded the substitution of trustee. See id. 'TT 13. Despite 
the trustee's violation of Utah Code§ 57-1-22 and the lack of a validly appointed trustee 
at the time of the sale, the court held that the borrower had failed to meet her burden of 
proving that the sale should be declared void. See id. ,r 18. 6 The court focused on the 
borrower's failure to allege in her complaint how the late substitution of trustee sacrificed 
her rights or resulted in any unfair dealing. See id. The court explained that the borrower 
failed to allege that she was denied any right to cure the default, that she ever planned to 
cure the default or was capable of doing so, or that the trustee's actions affected the 
bidding or sale price. See id. These factors are also present in this case. 7 Because this 
Court had ~ade clear that a non-judicial foreclosure sale will be set aside only in cases 
involving unjust extremes, the Court of Appeals explained that "the proper remedy is to 
seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge irregularities and 
6 Although the person who was acting as trustee in Reynolds could have exercised 
the power of sale had he been appointed, he lacked the authority to do so at the time of 
the sale because he had not been appointed trustee. Given this lack of appointment, that 
person was in weaker position legally to transfer title of the property than ReconTrust at 
the time of the sale in this case. 
7 For example, the Adamsons never attempted to contact ReconTrust before the 
sale, see Trial Tr. 29:4-5, and did not attend the sale, see Trial Tr. 30:1-3. And there was 
no evidence that they could have cured the default or that the sale price was lower 
because ReconTrust exercised the power of sale. 
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protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is executed and 
delivered to the purchaser." Id. ,r 15.8 
Reynolds is the latest in a long line of cases upholding a trustee's sale despite 
violations of the Utah Trust Deed Act, because there was no evidence of fraud, unfair 
dealing, or harm to the person seeking to set aside the sale. See, e.g., Timm, 2003 UT 4 7, 
~,r 36-37 (notice of sale not sent via certified or registered mail); Concepts, 743 P.2d at 
~ 1159-60 (typographical error in the notice of trustee's sale as to the year the sale would 
occur); RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290, ,r,r 16-18, 263 P.3d 1152 
(notice of default filed by substitute trustee before notice of substitution of trustee was 
filed); Occidental/Neb. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 219-20 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (notice of default and election to sell erroneously described property and notice of 
sale was mailed before three-month waiting period lapsed); cf Pierucci v. US. Bank, NA, 
2015 UT App 80, ~ 14, 347 P.3d 837 (applying Concepts to a case that involved 
challenges to a foreclosure sale based on the trustee's alleged failure to accept 
modification payments). 
2. This High Bar Serves Important Purposes. 
Requiring "heightened proof' that a debtor was prejudiced by some 
noncompliance with the Trust Deed Act to set aside a foreclosure sale promotes 
important ends. First, it serves to protect the interests of bona fide purchasers-both 
8 The trial court did not apply the rule from Reynolds, however, because the trial 
court believed it was bound by Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542 
(1880). As explained in Part II.A.I, Singer is readily distinguishable from this case and 
was not even binding precedent, given that it was decided by the Utah Territorial 
Supreme Court. 
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initial purchasers and subsequent ones. As this Court has explained, "[ o ]ur statutes 
protect a bona fide purchaser at a public sale under a trust deed, by permitting him to rely 
on the recitals in the deed he receives from the trustee after the sale." Blodgett, 590 P.2d 
at 303. Hence, there is a "presumption that a trustee's deed, which states that it complies 
with the statutory requirements, is 'conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers' 
of the trustee's deed's validity." RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ,I 17 n.5 (quoting 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-l-28(2)(c)(ii)). 
Second, it ensures that non-judicial foreclosure sales are more likely to have fair 
bids. As the Court of Appeals has recognized, "[t]he requirement that the trustor raise 
any issues prior to sale is consistent with the importance of protecting the validity of 
trustee's deeds, thus promoting bidding at trustee's sales and improving the chances that 
a sale will be for fair market value." Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, ,r 16. This rule 
promotes bidding at fair market value because bidders know that if any problem existed 
with the sale, the trustor will have been required to have raised the issue before the bidder 
could purchase the property. 
Third, this rule avoids disrupting ownership of land. As the Court of Appeals has 
acknowledged, "[ w ]hen . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for finality is at its 
apex." Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp. v. lnt'l Inv. & Dev. Corp., 1999 UT App 232, ,r 10, 986 
P.2d 765. This need is protected by ensuring that the debtor cannot use a violation of the 
Trust Deed Act-that ultimately made no difference on the outcome of the sale-to set 
aside the sale and disrupt titles to land. 
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Fourth, this rule complements the "statutory right to cure the default, which also 
must be exercised during the three-month grace period before a trustee's sale is held." 
Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, ,r 16 ( emphasis omitted). Given that the Trust Deed Act 
provides specific procedures for challenging a foreclosure sale, any remedies for 
violating that Act should not excuse a borrower's failure to comply with the Act. 
3. This High Bar Is Appropriate For Sales Conducted By An 
Appointed, Qualified Trustee Without The Power Of Sale. 
This high bar of setting aside a non-judicial foreclosure sale should apply to sales 
conducted by an appointed, qualified trustee who lacked the power of sale. Notably, 
nowhere in the Trust Deed Act did the State Legislature declare that any type of violation 
of the Act invalidates a sale. Indeed, such a harsh result-particularly after a trustee's 
sale has taken place and the property has been purchased by a bona fide purchaser-
would undermine the confidence of Utah citizens to purchase property in a foreclosure 
sale. Moreover, it is incompatible with the State Legislature's view of this issue, which is 
reflected in its 2011 adoption of Utah Code § 57-1-23.5. This statute allows a 
debtor/trustor to recover monetary damages for a sale conducted by an unauthorized 
~ person equal to the greater of actual damages or $2,000, in addition to costs and 
attorney's fees. See UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-1-23.5(2)(a).9 
Allowing a sale to be voided absent fraud or other extreme circumstances is 
particularly unwarranted when a violation of the Trust Deed Act resulted from an act 
9 This statute was enacted after the sale in this case, and does not apply 
retroactively. It does, however, provide constructive insight into the Legislature's view 
of how this precise issue should be addressed. 
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undertaken in good faith. When ReconTrust exercised the power of sale in this case, this 
Court had not decided Sundquist. Indeed, at the time ReconTrust was exercising the 
power of sale in this case, no case had held that Recon Trust lacked the authority to do 
so-and ReconTrust' s view of its authority was later ratified by multiple decisions from 
federal courts. See, e.g., Garrett, 546 F. App'x at 737; Baker v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing LP, No. 2: 11-cv-00720 CW, 2012 WL 464024, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2012) 
(not reported); Dutcher v. Matheson, No. 2:ll-CV-666 TS, 2012 WL 423379, at *4-8 0 
(D. Utah Feb. 8, 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 733 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 
2013). 
Further, the purpose of limiting who can serve as a qualified trustee with the 
power of sale is not undermined by this rule. As the Tenth Circuit made clear, the 
purpose of Utah Code § 57-1-21 is to "[m]ak[e] it easier for Utahns to meet with 
trustees." Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Jones, 
761 P.2d at 41 n.2 ("The detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real 
property under Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-23 to -34 (1986) are intended to protect the 
debtor/truster." (citing Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160)). In other words, the Trust Deed Act 
is intended simply to provide a shield to a debtor's rights in the property; it was not 
intended to be "use[ d] as a sword" to carve out extreme remedies that may result from its 
breach. See Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160. Requiring a debtor to show how he was 
prejudiced by any alleged noncompliance with the Act ensures that the Act serves this 
purpose for which it was enacted. 
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III. The Adamsons Failed To Meet This High Burden Of Proof To Set Aside The 
Sale. 
When the correct test is applied, the Adamsons' failure to prove that the sale 
should be set aside is indisputable. See Trial Tr. 22: 1-3 9: 19 ( evidence presented by the 
Adamsons); Trial Tr. 60:8-25 (Distressed Asset arguing that the heightened standard 
applied). Specifically, they failed to present evidence that an "unjust extreme" would 
result if ReconTrust were allowed to exercise the power of sale in lieu of a Utah attorney 
or title insurance company. Nor did they present evidence that: (1) any interest was 
sacrificed or that some attendant fraud or unfair dealing arose from having ReconTrust 
serve as trustee; (2) they were denied the ability to cure the default or that they were 
capable of curing the default, or (3) that ReconTrust's involvement affected the bidding 
or the sale price of the property. Indeed, they have never even alleged that they could 
meet this heightened standard of proof. 
IV. The Trial Court's Ruling Has Severe Consequences. 
The trial court's holding that the foreclosure sale and resulting trustee's deed are 
void is a drastic and extraordinary ruling that will have severe negative consequences for 
citizens of Utah. 
A void deed "cannot be ratified or accepted, and anyone can attack its validity in 
court." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,I 18 (footnote omitted). It also "carries no title on which a 
bona fide purchaser may rely." Bennion Ins. Co. v. 1st OK Corp., 571 P.2d 1339, 1341 
(Utah 1977). Under the trial court's ruling, therefore, bona fide purchasers-whether an 
entity like Distressed Asset or an individual owner who purchased a property-will lose 
{37083362;1 }29 
their interest in properties sold by a national bank even though the purchasers have 
owned the property, made improvements on it, and have been paying property taxes and 
insurance, in some cases for years. 
Even more troubling than the impact on the initial bona fide purchaser's interest in 
the property, subsequent bona fide purchasers will lose their interests as well. Consider 
this scenario: A debtor defaults and voluntarily vacates the property after the trustee's 
sale conducted by ReconTrust seven years ago, and a bona fide purchaser, the Smith 0 
family, buys the property. The Smith family, having paid taxes on the property and 
renovated the house, later sold the property to the Jones family, who also paid taxes on 
the property. They then sold the property to the Williams family. If this hypothetical 
property were subjected to a void ruling by this Court, a long line of bona fide purchasers 
could have their interests undone. This involuntary voiding of conveyances would 
potentially lead to claims involving all three families concerning the warranties in the 
deeds through which they transferred the property. 
Declaring deeds void could raise other issues. For instance, liens that were 
extinguished by foreclosure sales would no longer be extinguished. In other words, 
thousands of property sales will be affected either directly or indirectly. Sorting through 
the land records and determining who should have what interests in each property and 
what monetary compensation may be owed from one person to another would require a 
herculean effort-and an unnecessary one if the debtor who defaulted suffered no harm 
from having a national bank rather than _a Utah attorney or title insurance company 
exercise the power of sale. 
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At the same time, defaulted borrowers like Samuel Adamson will receive a 
windfall merely by showing that a national bank executed certain foreclosure documents 
instead of a Utah title insurance company or Utah attorney. They will be able to 
challenge the validity of sales, for the first time, months or even years after the sales 
occurred and the property has been sold multiple times. They will be able to remain in 
possession of the property even if they have failed to pay any taxes or insurance or other 
~ value for the property since the foreclosure sale. And some defaulted borrowers may not 
even want the sales undone-they may not want to live in the property, pay taxes on the 
property, or insure the property. Though these borrowers may have desired to move on, a 
ruling that ReconTrust's foreclosures are all void will not give these borrowers that 
choice. 
These consequences are not theoretical. Borrowers have already relied on the trial 
court's ruling to seek eviction of Utah homeowners who purchased a foreclosed property 
at a sale in which ReconTrust exercised the power of sale. See Add. at A-35 (Notice, 
Zamacona v. Blake, Lis Pendens: WG-545-B-1 (Utah Dist. Ct. Feb. 3, 2015). 10 This 
assault on the property rights of Utah citizens is inconsistent with the importance of 
requiring finality in title to real property, see Am. Estate Mgmt. Corp., 1999 UT App 232, 
110 (quoted supra p. 26), and is wholly inconsistent with the purpose of Utah Code§ 57-
1-23-to provide debtors an opportunity to meet with trustees prior to foreclosure, see 
10 This Court may take judicial notice of a filed lis pendens. See J.M W. v. TI.Z, 
2011 UT 38, ,I 6 n.l, 266 P.3d 702 .. 
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supra Part II.B.3. None of these consequences were specifically addressed in the trial 
court's opinion, but they are real and merit this Court's consideration. 
The trial court's decision holding that the sale is void is extraordinary because 
there are no Utah appellate cases or statutes requiring or even supporting this drastic 
remedy. That is undoubtedly because the sole statutory remedy for these sales allows 
only limited monetary relief when a sale is conducted by a trustee who lacks authority to 
exercise the power of sale. See supra Part II.B.3; Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'! 
Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (explaining that when a statute sets 
forth certain remedies, courts presume that no other remedy is available). Although Utah 
Code § 57-1-23.5 does not have retroactive effect on the properties in this case, its 
express remedies certainly provide a reasonable framework for a court-ordered remedy in 
an analogous situation. The trial court's holding that a sale conducted before enactment 
of this statute should be considered void is inconsistent with the limited monetary remedy 
authorized by the current statute. 
V. The Adamsons Are Barred From Challenging The Validity Of The 
Foreclosure Sale By The Doctrines Of Waiver And Estoppel. 
Even if the Adamsons had attempted to meet the heightened burden set forth in 
Concepts, which they did not, those defenses are waived. The A damsons failed to raise 
timely arguments relating to ReconTrust's authority to exercise the power of sale. Under 
Utah law, a debtor's interests are "protected ... up to the moment that the property [is] 
sold and a trustee's deed issue[s]." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1161. During that time, if a 
debtor seeks to challenge whether a sale complies with the Utah Trust Deed Act's 
,,, 
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requirements, "the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a 
debtor to challenge irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a 
trustee's deed is executed and delivered to the purchaser." Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206, 
,I 15. 
Debtors who fail to exercise their remedies before a foreclosure sale occurs are 
barred from later doing so under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel, except where an 
irregularity or defect renders the sale "a complete legal nullity": 
[A] mortgagor may by acquiescence and failure to assert his 
rights at the proper time be estopped to set up irregularities in 
the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser. 
Furthermore, the cardinal principle of estoppel, that one who 
knowingly and silently permits another to expend money on 
land, under a belief that he has title, will not be permitted to 
set up his own right to the exclusion of the rights of the one 
who made the improvements, finds application in a variety of 
ways where land has been sold under invalid foreclosure 
proceedings. 
Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1989) 
(alteration in original) ( citation omitted). 
In this case, ReconTrust executed and recorded a notice of default and election to 
G) sell that states that ReconTrust, as trustee, had elected to sell the property. See Trial Tr. 
19: 12-15; Trial Ex. 1. The notice provided a phone number if the Adamsons had any 
questions. See Trial Ex. 1. The Adamsons neither attempted to contact ReconTrust 
before the sale regarding the validity of the sale, nor did they seek an injunction or file a 
lawsuit prior to the sale to prevent it from occurring. See Trial Tr. 71: 12-18 ( court 
stating that the Adamsons "knew the sale, and they did nothing to stop it" and that the 
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Adamsons "didn't file a lawsuit before the sale to try and stop the sale"); R. 412 ( court 
finding that "Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred."). 
They offered no explanation for failing to challenge the sale before it occurred. See Trial 
Tr. 29: 1-5 (Samuel Adamson testifying that he "never would have thought to call or 
contact ReconTrust" regarding the notice of default and election to sell). Indeed, they 
waited until almost a year after the sale was concluded to challenge its validity by filing a 
putative class action, and they never filed a lis pendens against the property. See R. 415 G 
n.9 (referring to the federal class action lawsuit that Samuel Adamson filed in November 
2010); Trial Tr. 36:9-25. In other words, they knowingly failed to assert their rights until 
several months after the sale occurred, without any reason, and therefore should have 
been prohibited from challenging the sale at trial. 
VI. At Most, The Trustee's Deed Issued By ReconTrust Is Voidable. 
If the Court determines that the trustee's deed in this case is invalid, the Court 
need not go so far as declaring it void ab initio. Instead, the Court should treat the 
trustee's deed as merely voidable. Cf Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah 
1993) ("Under well-established law a number of cases have held 'void' to mean 
'voidable' only."). A voidable deed is one that "offend[s] an individual, such as those 
arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,r 19. A voidable 
deed "may be ratified at the election of the injured party" and "[ o ]nee ratified, the 
voidable ... deed is deemed valid." Id. ,r 18. "[S]ilence with full knowledge of the facts 
may ... operate as a ratification." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) 
( citation omitted). 
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The sale and resulting deed were ratified by the Adamsons when they failed to 
timely object to the validity of the sale; therefore, the sale and deed should be deemed 
valid. See supra Part III. Even if the Adamsons did not ratify the sale, the deed is 
enforceable by Distressed Asset, a bona fide purchaser, because a voidable deed is 
"unassailable in the hands of a [bona fide purchaser]." Broadbent v. Powers, No. CIV 
2:05 CV 375, 2006 WL 2527429, at *3 (D. Utah Aug. 29, 2006) (unpublished) (quoting 
~ Roger A. Cunningham et al., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 720 (West 1984)). 
The trial court refused to rely on Ockey and its definitions of void and voidable 
deeds, claiming that it involved a conveyance by a trustee after the termination of a trust 
and "did not involve a trustee's foreclosure sale." R. 414 n.6. Ockey, however, is not 
limited to the context of express trusts. Ockey' s discussion of void and voidable acts 
relied on cases from other contexts, including Millard County School District, 14 P .2d at 
971-72 (finding securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority were not 
void) and Zion's Service Corp. v. Danielson, 366 P .2d 982, 985-86 (196 I) (finding void 
a contract intended to control prices and limit competition between the bids given by 
masonry contractors). See Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ,rcn 22-24. This rule applies to deeds like 
the one in this case, and applying that rule makes clear that, at most, the sale here was 
voidable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing Distressed Asset's 
unlawful-detainer action. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DISTRESSED ASSEX SOLUTIONS FUND 
I, LLC, DECISION AND ORDERDISlVIISSING 
ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAMUEL D. ADAMSON; COUR1NEY D. 
ADAMSON; et al.,. 
Defendants. 
Case No. 140500067 
Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox 
This is an action for unlawful detainer, which came on for trial on August 7, 2014, after 
which the court took the matter under advisement. The court now dismisses this action for the 
reasons given below. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 78B-6-802.5, 
A previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a property is guilty ~of unlawful 
detainer if the person: 
(1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in d~sposition of the property by a 
· trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and 
(2) c-ontinues to occupy the property after ~e trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after 
· being served with a notice to qll:it by the purchaser. 
At trial, Plaintiff presented as· exhibits certified copies of the notice of default, the trust 
000-402 
A-11 
deed, and its own quitclaim deed, thus making out a prima facie case under the statute. 1 
In defense, however, Defendants raised ~e issue of whether subdivision (l)'s 
requirement of ''disposition of the property by a trustee's sale" has been satisfied.2 ·There appears 
to be no question that Defendants defaulted on their obligations under a note se.cured by a trust 
deed, and that ReconTrust, acting as trustee, gave notice of default and intention to sell the 
property, and ultimately conducted a.trustee's sale in January 2010, purporting to sell the 
property to Plaintiff's predecessor in interest. 
· Defendants argue that because the 2010 trustee's sale was conducted by ReconTnist, who 
was not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23, 
see Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Sundquist 2013 UT 45, ,r 13, 311 P.3d 1004 ("ReconTrilst is 
neither a member of the Utah State Bar nor a #tle insurance company or agency with an office in 
the State of Utah. ReconTrust.was therefore not a qualified trustee with the power of sale under 
Utah Code sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23."); kl:.,~ 49 ("As a national bank operating in Utah 
1 Plaintiff also agreed to file, after trial, a certified copy of the 2007 trust deed, but thus 
far has not done so. 
2 In addressing this defense, the court considers, in addition to the evidence and 
argllIIlents presented at trial, the briefing submitted on Defendants' Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment. At trial, the court· indicated that it would not grant such motion at that time because 
there was nothing in Defendants' pleadings suggesting that they were seeking declaratory relief. 
However, also as indicated at trial, the m_otion addresses the substance of Defendants~ defense, so 
the court references such briefing as a matter of convenience. Plaintiffs opposition memorandum 
filed May 23, 2014, is referenced herein as "Mem. Opp." 
2 
000403 .. 
A-2 
under the [National Banking Act], ReconTrust is precluded from exercising the power of a 
trustee under Utah statute for purposes of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure."), the sale and 
resulting trust deed are null and void ab initio. 
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Sundquist court expressly declined to decide what effect, 
if any, its determination that ReconTrust did not qualify as a trustee with the power of sale would 
have on the validity of the sale and resulting trust deed. See llL, ,r 50 ("Our opinion-in this matter 
is limited to the narrow issue of whether Utah law regarding the qualification of trustees is 
preempted by the [National Banking Act]. In briefing and oral argument, the parties have 
attempted to raise a variety of other issues relating to the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale, the validity of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of restitution. Because these 
issues were not fully litigated below, we decline to reach them on interlocutory appeal."). 
However, as Plaintiff also points out, the Court of Appeals has been presented with 
arguments similar to those of Defendants, and has not even considered it necessary to reach the~ 
where the party attacking the validity of a trustee's sale failed to allege or prove how its rights 
were affected by the defect complained of. For example, in RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 
UT App 290, 263 P .3 d 1152, the defendants in an unlawful detainer action "argued that the trust 
deed ~ale was void because [the trustee] recorded the notice of default before it had been 
substituted as trustee, that the statute did not allow [the beneficiary] to ratify [the 1:ru:Stee's] 
action, and that the execution of the substitution of trustee violated the statute of frauds." ML, 1 
3 
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__ · G 
r.·., 
'iiU 
15. · On review, the Court of Appeals declined to "reach the merits of these issues because the· 
[defendants], in attacking the trust deed sale's validity after the sale, ha[d] not met their burden 
of proving that the alleged irregularity affected their rights," id. (footnote omitted), and "[ did] not 
claim that they were denied the right to cure the default or ever planned on or were capable of 
curing the default.'' Id., 118 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App 206, 285 P.3d 7, the plaintiff argue_d 
"that the trustee's sale [was] void" because the individual who "recorded the notice of default and 
held the trustee's sale" did so "before [the beneficiary J executed and recorded a written 
substitution of trustee." ML ~ 13. The plaintiff also, challenged the beneficiary's later "attempt ·to 
ratify [this individual's] actions after the trustee sale." Id. In other words, like Defe11:dants here, 
the· plaintiff attacked the validity of the sale based on the questionable authority of the one who 
conducted it. Again, the Court of Appeals declined fo decide these issues on their merits based on 
the fact that, "in attacking the validity of the trustee's sale, [the plaintiff] ha[d] not alleged that 
the challenged substitution of trustee impacted her rights." Id. 
In contrast to RM Lifestyle~ and Reynolds are two cases cited by Defendants. First,. in an 
early Utah Supreme Court case, the court ?eld a trust sale void where it was not performed _by the 
person authorized under the deed of trust: 
The deed of trust authorized the sale to be made by the United States Marshal. 
1bis was nbf cicme. One of his deputies made the sale as auctioneer. It is not 
claimed th~t he acted as deputy, but simply that a person who was a deputy acted 
4 
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c!-5 the auctioneer. Nor do we think that the marshal could hav~ acted by deputy, 
unless the deed of trust had shown express authority to that effect, which it did not 
do. The fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has been shown, does not affect the 
question. Nor is it affected by the fact, that the purchaser was an innocent party. 
The sale was made by one not authorized to make it, and cannot be uphe-Id. It is 
simply void, and no one gains any rights under it. A purchaser must know that the 
sale is made by the proper person. The deed of trust shows who could make the 
sale. A trustee can no doubt employ .an auctioneer to act for him in crying off the 
property; but the trustee must be present ai:id superintend the sale. The trustee in 
the present instance says that he does not think he was present at the sale. 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Chalmers, 2 Utah 542, 546-47 (Utah Terr. 1880) (emphasis added). 
More recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court ruling that a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale for delinquent assessments owed to a condominium association was void where 
the sale was conducted by the association's attorney because "[t]he record reveal[ed] that, though 
its attorney may have qualified as a trustee under the Trust Deed Act, the Association failed to 
appoint its attorney as such." McOueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Ass1n. Inc., 2013 
UT App 53, 11 19-21 & 28, 298 P.3d 666. 
Notably, the McQueen cqurt does not discuss the obstacles to setting aside a trustee sale 
that were mentioned, and indeed dispositive, in the RM Lifestyles and Reynolds case_s, as 
summarized above. Rather, the court simply addressed the claimed defect - the absence of the 
statutorily required qualified appointed trustee - on its merits, and agreed that it ren~ered the sale 
void. Reconciliation of these cases is difficult. 
Reconciliation of Singer with RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also difficult. To say, as do 
5 
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these later cases, that a party attacking the validity of a trustee sale must allege that the claimed 
defect result~d in an injury to "the interests of the debtor," or "some attendant fraud or unfair 
dealing," RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 290, ~ 16, or a circumstance "reach[ing] unjust 
extremes," id.; Reynolds, 2012 UT App 206,, 15, is plainly at odds with Singer's statement that, 
i;;f) · where an unauthorized person conducts the sale, "[t]he fact that no injury or fraud in the sale has 
been shown, does not affect the question." 2 Utah at 54 7. 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Singer on the ground that the deed of trust in that case 
specified who could conduct the sale, and that there is no such provision in the trust deed here. 
Plaintiff also notes that Singer was decided well before the current governing statutes, and 
criticizes Defendants for not providing any additional authority to support their argument that the 
sale here is void. 
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the provisions in Utah Code sections 57-1-
21 and 57-1-23 restricting who is authorized to conduct a trustee's sale are clearly comparable to 
the trust deed provision identifying who was authorized to conduct the sale in Singer, particularly 
since "a contract," such as the trust deed here, "implicitly contains the laws existing at the time it 
was entered."3 Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Shexwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665,669 (Utah Ct 
3 It is unnecessary to decide which law to apply here (i.e., the law in effect in August 
2007 when the trust deed was executed, or the law in effect in January 2010, when the trust sale 
' . . 
occurred) since the statutory provisions defining a qualified trustee did not change between these 
periods. 
6 
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App. 1990) (citing, among other cases, Beehive Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n, 583 P.2d 53, 
60 (Utah 1978) (citing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595,601, 24 L.Ed. 793 (1878) (holding that 
contracts embrace laws which affect their validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement))); 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 739 (WestlawNext database updated June 2014) ("The power to sell under 
deed of trust is [a] matter of contract between [the] mortgagor and mortgagee under the terms 
and conditions expressed in [the] deed of trust instrument. It cannot be enlarged beyond the terms 
of the contract and the incorporated relevant statutes.") (emphasis added and footnotes.omitted). 
Thus, this attempted distinction fails. 
Second, while Singer is an older case, it is consistent with prevailing law on the subject 
today, as well as with current Utah statutory law. As· a leading treatise on ~eal estate financing 
explains: 
Generally, defects in the exercise of a power of sale can be categorized in at least 
three ways - void, voidable, or inconsequential. 
Some defects are so substantial that they render the sale void. In this situation, 
neither legal nor equitable title transfers to the sale purchaser or subsequent 
grantees, except perhaps by adverse possession .... A sale ... is void when 
someone other than the named trustee conducts the sale, including a successor 
who has not been validly appoin~ed, or, conversely, if the original trustee conducts 
the sale after a successor-trustee has been appointed. 
Most defects render the foreclosure voidable and not void. When a voidable error 
occurs, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the redemption 
rights of those injured by the defective foreclosure. Typically, a voidable error is 
"an irregularity in the execution of a foreclosure sale" and must be "substantial or 
result in a probable unfairness." ... If the defect only renders the sale voidable, 
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the redemption rights can be cut off if a bona· fide purchaser for value acquires the 
land. When this occurs, an action for damages against the foreclosing mortgagee 
or trustee may be the only remaining remedy. 
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential that they render the sale neither ~oid 
nor voidable. These defects commonly involve minor discrepancies in the notice 
of sale .... 
Grant S. Nelson, Dale A. Whitm.an et al, Real Estate Finance Law§ 7:21 at 953-957 (6th ed. 
2014) (hereinafter Nelson & Whitman) (underscoring added and footnotes omitted; italics in 
original). 
Viewed within this framework, Singer clearly talces its place in the first category, and the 
prerequisites to setting aside a sale identified in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds are seen to be 
applicable only to those defects properly categorized as rendering a sale voidable rather than 
void. This is consistent with Singer, which expressly disavows any such prerequisites as to a sale 
conducted by one not authorized to do so. It is also consistent with McOueen, ~hich affirmed 
. that a sale was void based only on the fact that the person who conducted it had not been 
appointed as a trustee as statutorily required. 
The limited applicability of the prerequisites stated in RM Lifestyles and Reynolds is also 
shown by examination of the cases cited therein. For instance, bot4 cases quote the statement 
made in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1160 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam}, that "[a] sale once made will not be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were 
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair dealing." 2011 UT App 290, 116; 2012 
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UT App 206, ,I 14. Concepts involved the attempted invalidation of a sale based on the fact that 
the notice of sale, which was printed in 1983, incorrectly stated that the sale was to be conducted 
on a given date in 1982, see 743 P.2d at 1159-a defect that the court ultimately characterized as 
a "minor typographical error." Id. at 1161. Thus, the statement quoted is clearly taken from a case 
falling into the third category described above ( one involving "minor discrep.ancies in the notice 
of sale"), not one involving what Singer held to be a fundamental error.4 
Similarly, RM Lifeszyles and Reynolds each state that a trustee's sale should be set aside 
"only in cases which reach unjust extremes." 201 I UT App 290, ~ 16; 2012 UT App 206; ,i 15. 
For this proposition, RM Lifestyles cites Thomas v. Johns.on, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), which in tum cited Concepts, see Mh, and which involved only a challenge to the manner 
.- in which the sale was conducted - namely, the trustee's acceptanc~ of a bid offering to pay "fair 
market value" (rather than a specific dollar amount) for the property. The court rejected this 
challenge, holding that the statute ~as satisfied by the bid and "find[ing] no evidence that [the 
4 Significantly, Concepts actually reiterates the underlying principle from Singer 
(although with a different focus in mind-namely, the party intended to benefit from statutory 
notice requirements), that "[t]he maker of the deed of trust with power of sale may condition the 
exercis.e of the power upon such conditions as he may describe." 743 P.2ci at 1160 (citing 
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. 1983)) (emphasis 
omitted). The cited case elaborates, as noted in Concepts, saying that "[t]he grantor of the power 
[ of sale] is entitled to have his directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of sale given; to have 
it to talce place at the. time and place, and by the person appointed by him." 650 S. W.2d at 768 
( emphasis added and citation omitted). 
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debtor's] interests were sacrificed· by the trustee's action .... " Id. at 189. 5 RM Lifestyle·s and 
Reynolds also cite Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ~~ 36-37, 86 P.3d 699, which ~gain merely 
reiterated the holding of Concepts, and which, like Concepts, involved - as pertinent ~ere - only 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the notice of the sale given to the debtor. Id. 
Thus, none of the cases cited to support the prerequisites identified in RM Lifestyles and 
Reynolds involved "a purported sale by an unautho!ized person," which is to be distinguished 
from cases in which there is merely "a question of procequral irregularities in a trustee's sale." 
Citizens Bank of Edina v. W. Quincy Auto Auction, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. 1987) (en 
bane). Where, as here (and as in Singer), there is "a completely unauthorized sale conducted by 
an individual who was powerless to' sell the property," it is irrelevant "[w]hether.in point of fact, 
the sale of the property was conducted in all respects judiciously or not, or in a manner most 
conducive to the interests of those concerned," although "[t]his would be a legitimate inquiry in a 
proceeding to set aside a sale ~ade under the power conferred by the instrument. .... " Id. 
( citation omitted). Thi~ conclusion is inconsistent with Reynolds. but that case must yield to 
Singer based on the principle that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply cannot overrule the law as 
5 Thomas also included a footnote summarily rejecting the debtor's additional challenge 
in that case to the trustee's acceptance of a credit bid rather than "requir[ing] the bid to be 
'payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale,' as allegedly instructed in the 
trust deed"-· a provision that. if it existed. the court held to be satisfied by the credit bid. See 801 
P.2d at 188 n.1. · 
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announced by the highest court in the state, even if the announcement was made decades ago.', 
Sentry Investigations, Inc. v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Plaintiff also relies on the holding in Reynolds that, "[ a]bsent such exceptional 
circumstances [i.e., hann to the interests of the debtor, fraud, unfair dealing, or unjust extremes], 
the proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to a sale, which allows a debtor to challenge 
irregularities and protect her rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's deed is exe~uted 
and delivered to the purchaser." 2012 UT App 206, ~ 15 ( citing RM Lifestyles, 2011 UT App 
290, , 15 n.4 (internal citation omitted)) ( emphasi~ added). Because, as just discussed, 
Reynolds's requirerp.ent of harm, etc. as a prerequisite to setting aside a trustee's sale must be 
limited (under Singer) to those cases involving defects rendering a ~ale voidable rather than void, 
the companion requirement that challenges to irregularities be raised via a pre-sale injunction 
proceeding, except where hann, etc~, is shown, must likev,ise be so limited. To hold otherwise. 
would be to say that a debtor need not attempt to obtain a pre-sale injunction in a case in which 
the sale is only voidable (because it may be set aside thereafter by a showing of harm, etc.), but 
that such an attempt must be made where the sale is utterly void. 
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that ~'the cloctrines of waiver and estoppel bar Defendants' 
claim that the Foreclosure Sale is void and should be set aside.'' ~e~. Opp. at 9. To support this 
argument, Plaintiff observes that 
Defendants did not challenge the Foreclosure Sale before it occurred. It is 
11 
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undisputed that the Foreclpsure Sale took place fa January 20 I 0. It is also 
undisputed that although the Defendants in this case filed a class-action suit in 
federal court in November 2010, they have not prosecuted their claims .in the 
Federal Action since the ruling in Garrett in September 2013, which ruled that a 
foreclosure sale done in Utah by ReconTrust was valid. It is undisputed that 
Defendants filed a Motion to Set Aside the Foreclosure Sale in the Prior State 
Case in July 2010, but failed to prosecute this claim, and allow~d the case to be 
dismissed on June 21, 2012. Importantly, although the Defendants in this case 
were, or are, parties in the Prior·state Action and Federal Action respectively, they 
failed to ever record a lis pendens on the Property. It is also undisputed that 
Defendants have failed to pay any value; and have failed to pay property taxes, for 
the Property since June 2009. Like the mortgagor in American Falls Canal 
Securities Co., the Defendants in this case have failed to properly and timely 
assert their rights to defeat the rights of Plaintiff, an innocent bona fide purchaser. 
Defendants have knowingly and silently sat on any alleged rights they have to the 
Property, and most importantly, have allowed Plaintiff to expend money 
purchasing the Property. Defendants do not claim they had the ability to cure the 
default and stop the Foreclosure Sale. Defendants did not challenge the sale before 
it occurred, and therefore, the Trustee's Deed from ReconTrust must remain 
valid. [FN] I 
[FN] 1 Even· if the court'considered a trustee's deed voidable, "[a] voidable deed .. 
. 'is unassailable in the hands o'f a [bona fide purchaser]."' See SEC v. Madison 
Real Estate Group, LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2009) (citation 
omitted). 
Mem. Opp. at 9~10. 
In the American Falls case cited, the Supreme Court recognized that "a party otherwise in 
position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded fr~m doing so based 
upon conduct sufficient to bring into operation ¢.e doctrines of waiver and estoppel." Am. Falls 
Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, ~14 (Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted). 
The court indicated; however, that a party may not W?J.i:V~ the right to challenge, or be estopped 
12 
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from ch~lenging, a sale wh~llY: void, see· id. ("[E]xcept where no~-compliance results in a · 
complete legal nullity, one otherwise entitled to object to a judicial sale in mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings as involving a defect or irregularity ·based upon a lack of or insufficient process, 
notice, advertisement or other designation with respect to the sale, designed for his benefit and 
protection, may waive, or be estopped from asserting, such defect or irregularity.") ( emphasis 
added and citation omitted); see also Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ~ 22, 189 P.3d 51, 57 
( distinguishing "' ... between an illegal or void contract and one merely ultra vires,' which could 
become enforceable by ratification or estoppel") (quoting Millard Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Bank 
of Millard Cnty., 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (1932)), which, under Singer, is what results 
from a trustee's sale conducted by one not having authority.6 
Moreover, eyen where it has been said that " [a] want of authority in the trustee making 
the sale may be waived by the parties in interest, or they may estop themselves by their conduct 
to object to such want of authority, at least as against the purchaser at the sale," ?9 C.J.S. 
Mortg~ges § 764 (WestlawNext databas~ updated June 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Kroff, 144 Mo. 
433, 46 S. W. 424 (1898); Spencer v. Hawkins, 39 N.C. 288, 4 Ired. Eq. 288, 1846 WL 1113 
6 Plaintiff relies on Ockey, which held that a conveyance effected by trustees after the 
termination of the trust "was merely voidable" rather than void, see 2008 UT 37,, 24, and on 
Millard County, which held that securities issued by a bank in excess of its statutory authority 
were likewise only voidable, see Mt, 122, but these cases did not involve a trustee's foreclosure 
sale, in which context the clear rule is shown by Singer and the other authorities discussed above. 
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(1846); Schwarz v. Kellogg, 243 S. W. 179 (rv.[o. 1922)), the conduct giving rise to the waiver or 
estoppel in the cited· c~es was considerably more affirmative than anything Defendants are 
·alleged to have done here. 
Certainly, Defendants' failure to pay taxes or any other value for the property since June 
2009, 7 while remaining in possession, is understandably frustrating for the foreclosure sale 
purchaser ( or its successor in interest), but it is not inconsistent with their claim that the sale is 
void, 8 nor can their failure to affirmatively pursue judicial vindication of their position during 
this period properly be so characterized.9 Cf. Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn~ 259,261,256 
7 At trial, Mr. Adamson actually acknowledged not having made payments since 
December 2008, explaining that, since April 2010, their lender refused to accept any payments. 
8 Indeed, under the circumstances, it would be the making of payments to the purchaser at 
the sale, or to its successor in interest, that would be would be inconsistent with Defendants' 
claim. 
9 Defendants' federal class-action lawsuit (initiated in November 2010), was stayed 
pending the outcome of Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 546 F. App1x 736 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(which, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, did not.unqualifiedly hold "that ReconTrust had the 
authority to act as a trustee in Utah, and therefore, the foreclosure saie that took place in the 
Garrett case was valid," Mem. Opp. at 3), and appears to remain pending. Resolution of the 
''Prior State Case" (case number 100501437 in this court) is difficult to follow. This w~s an 
unlawful detainer action filed·against Defendants by Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, and 
appears to have been dismissed due to the failure of both sides to appear at a hearing on or about 
June 19, 2012: (The Order of Dismissal is a minute entry for a hearing that appears to have been 
held on June 19, 2012 (the date of the caption), but the signature line on the order is dated June 
·20, 2012, which is also the file stamp date, and the order was filed in CORIS on June 21, 2012.) 
However, the parties in the case hac;i previously stipulated to continue the scheduled trial 
"without date,,, an order to that effect was entered on November 17, 2011, and no prior notice of 
any hearing scheduled thereafter appears in CORIS. 
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and Whitman went as far as to assert that "the conclusive impact" of such statutes should be 
limited "to procedural defects in the foreclosure process,'' consistent with the likely legislative 
intent. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosur~:_The Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1506-1507 (2004). 
Although this suggested bright-line limitation did not find its way into the most recent 
version of Nelson and Whitman's treatise, it appears to accurately reflect how these "conclusive'' 
statutory pre~umptions should be understood. See Main I Ltd. P'ship v. Venture Capital Const. & 
Dev. Coro., 154 Ariz. 256~ 260, 741 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (observing, with · 
reference to an Arizona conclusive presumption statute similar to that of Utah, and without 
apparent disagreement, that "[w]hen the California cases hold that recitals in a deed of trust are 
conclusive, they qualify that they ·are conclusive 'in the absence of grounds for equitable relief, rn 
but finding equitable relief inappropriate in a case where there was no "fraud, misrepresentation, 
... concealment," bad faith, or breach of fiduciary duty) (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
Among the traditional grounds for equitable relfef not specifically mentioned in Main I is, as 
previously indicated, the absence of a power of sale in the party conducting such sale. See 5 
Tiffany Real Prop. § 1550 (3d ed.) (WestlawNext database updated September 2013) ("It appears 
that _the sale will ordinarily be set aside in equity on grounds on which it would have been 
previously enjoined, as for instance where the debt never existed, or has been extinguished, or 
was conducted by a party without authority to do so, or where the notice of sale was ~ubstantially 
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Plaintiff also argues that the statutory remedy set forth iri Utah Code section 57-1-23.5 is 
exclusive, but this section was not added until 2011, the year after the sale at issue here, and 
. Plaintiff has made no argument to show its retroactive applicability. 
Finally, Plaintiff stresses that it is a boria fide purchaser for value. Assuming that to be 
true, 10 ho'Yever, -Singer clearly holds that such status cannot validate a void sale. This 
determinatidn is not altered by Utah Code section 57-1 ~281s provision stating that trust deed 
"recitals ofcompliance with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the 
exercise of the power of sale and sale _of the property described in the trustee's deed" "are 
conclusive evidence in favor of bona :fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without 
notice.'_' Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-28(2)(c)(ii). 
For obvious reasons, such provisions cannot be taken completely at face value. See 
Nelson & Whitman§ 7.22 at 982 (describing "[t]he literal language ofthls ... type of statute" as 
"breathtakingly broad in its impact on BFPs" as it "arguably applies even when the mortgagee 
had no substantive right to foreclose," such as where "a lender forecloses though the secured 
obligation is not in default or if the mortgage is forged" - a result that would be '.'fundamentally 
unfair and is probably legislatively unintended"). In an earlier treatment of the subject, Nelson 
10 Such an assumption may be unduly generous, given that Defendants have remained in 
possession of the property challenging the validity of the sale at all times since the sale, thereby 
giving notice to Plaintiff, prior to Plaintiffs purchase, of the claimed defect in the exercise of the 
power of sale. 
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defective.") ( emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Thus, the court concludes that the 
··protection afforded to BFPs by Utah Code section 57-1-28 is not intended to extend, and does 
not extend, to protect aga~nst defects traditionally viewed as fundamental, such as the one at issue 
here. 
For these reasons, the court holds that Plaintiff has not overcome Defendants' defense 
that there has been no "disposition of the property by a trustee's sale," as required under Utah 
Code section 78B-6-802.5, and accordingly dismisses this unlawful detainer action. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, AD!(JDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' wtlawful detainer action is dismissed. 
Dated this Q.I\JJ.- day of September, 2014. 
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parment together witlrthe principal and .. mferest as: set forth in the Noto .an.d any late c~ey, a ~ for{a) t~$ and 
special ~ents levied orto oe levied against.the Property, (b) leasehold payments or· ground .Iellts· on t1ie· Pl'o_periy, 
¢cr(c)-pre.miums (of ,ns~ce requij'ed ,~d~.Paragr.aph 4. In auy year in which tne Lender:mustpa:y a ji?.ortgage. 
.ins11nmce preJnium.:to~ Sec¢.my ofHQ~g &Qd:UrbanDe~Jopme:nt {~~~~taiy'); qr~ ~y-,yei.if iirwhlch-sitch 
premium would haw 'been.required if Lender still held the Security. Instrwnent ¢acll monthlyj>a;vment .shall !!Iso 
include: either: (i) a.mim for the annual mortgage msurance premiunito be paid 'b)'·Lende.r .to :the Secre.taty~ ot (ii) a 
monthly" charge· instead-of a motigage insurance premium if this Sectniiy Insttuiilent is held .by the Secretary, iii a 
r~~~le-amo~tJ~ ~~ d¢te,rniined by ;the _Se¢~m,iy. EtcepUhr ~ Jii@tltJy charge .by tlie $ecret,my1J:hese-1teiµs a¢ 
called '~scrowlt~msrt and.~-~ p~d to Lender are calleq ~~row Funds!' 
tendor may, at:-any time, c.rillect and hold amoW1ts for. &crow it,ms in an llggre~f.l;'l amount noi to exceed the· 
maxhnum amobht that may 'be :required tot Borrower's. escrow account under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act of 1974;.12 u.~.c. §·26,01 ~- and:4nplementipg~gw.atlons.,_i4_CF,Elf~f35-00; as,~ey. m~:fbe: ame~~e4 #.'t}~. 
time t9 time f.~ A,''), ~xc.ept that :1he -cllShion .. or ~c pe.gnitted: ey){ESP;A;fqr '!liJ.~n,tl~ipirt«J disbursements 'QT 
· dwbursements· before Borrowers paymerits are available in :th~ seem.mt may.not be based· _op. amounts due for·the 
mortgage insutanceprelilimn! · 
lf°t.1t¢ ~o"Qiit&-.h~l.4 !zy Lender f.¢' ~crow Jte$-exceeq the ~o\Pits•-pemiitt~d t<:1 :be ~eld b;y_RESP.4, Lenqer 
shaU -accoqnHo Bprr◊~er fo:r·th~- e~~ss ijµid$ ~~~-by ~:A. .Jf-1:h;~ _runo~ts of funds hel~. by Lep_de,· at.-{ll!Y 
:time ~ not suflfoi~ni'to. pay lhe· &<;row Items when .du~, Lender may notify: the- Bm,rowei: and ~quire: llt?IrQ"W~-fo 
make up the-shortage as petntlited by RF.SPA. . · · 
·wan Nd: ,802-1000025 
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The Escrow Funds are:-pledged as aclditjonal sec.:.m.iy for all $~,se~d ·t,y thi.s .S~tirlo/ :1n$UJn,ent. ):f. 
'Borrower tenders to Lender the.full pay.mdlt ofoilLstich: sums~: :Boirower'$ a.QOCJWl~ shall be credited 1yjth the ~aliu)ce 
:;reI,IlallllDg_ for. al) inst~ti, .item.s. (~). (b), -~ .{ c)' i!nd aey mortgage ~urance premimn fus!a]linenfthat Lender 'Jias:-
nat becqm~ a1iligated to pay to· ~ SepretarJ,;' ~ :;r.;e~der, sb.a!i. pz:oµrptly :refund any· excess funds to Borrower. 
Iimnediatel_y prior 1o a foreclosure sal~ .of the PJ'.OperlY or ~ acqtft~~()Jl. '.by U~der.. · BP110wers accti4nt shllli-~ 
credited mtb..any balahce·remainirtg.fota1lmstallnien1s for :i1ems"(a),. (b), ~d'(~). 
3. Appli~ti~n:.clf Paym~(s; Alf pay.Qi~ in,iiler'.Pat~Elphs i and 2 shall be applied by Lenueras foUpws: 
Fli-st to. the ~ortgage ins~ce p~mium to·.b,e paid: J;Y Lenger tc;, -~¢ ::!~cfetaiy or lo tlie :monthly ;charge ·by 
the Secretary 'instead .of the riionthly mortgage insurance premium; . . 
~ to $.Y,' ta:xes; ·speci~. asse$e~ts, iea.seho1ci payments. or ground rents, and .fire:,. flppd -and other 
h~arcl ii)sui'~e p;re.tni_um.s,. as :\"tqwre4j 
third. ,fo interestdQcHlnder tbi,Note; 
~ ,fo amtlftii.atlon of the prlnci_p'al of the Note; and 
Fiftfi..,tgJ,~e c;h,arge~ d1'~ $.9~ fl¢ N.o~~. 
4. .Fir,c; F,Jooil and :Other' Hazard Insura..,~e. ~µ;r.row;r sh.all '.fu.sqre al~ imw.PWW~.Jlts oii the Pro~,· 
whether now in e.xistence·or subseguently erected,. agai.nst·any•harards, casualtie~, and. conJh.Jgen¢if?SJ:mclQqirig_fire~ for 
whii:Jt V~~ requ~ 1µsu,raµce~ ·tws insu.rance. shall be maintained in ~ amounts and. far the ~rlod~ fu~ Le,!ld~r 
J:etIUir.es, »~r,rower_ sllall · cµso insµre- ~ ~prQwmeAf~ ~ri, ~ Pro.perly •. whether .now in tPd·sten~. or :$nbsegrtenily 
etePte~ i!gafust Joss by floods: to the e*nt·reqJJi@d by i:Jie ,Secre~. ~ n:i~ce s.}iail ·oe ~ed wit~: companies: 
approved by Lender. The msttranc,;i policies and .aizy rene.wals $ball·be h.eld ~ ~nder aµl:1 ~h~ inclµde :IQss payal11e· 
c1at1~s-i~t~YW 9(: and 1:D. af.omi ~eptable to, Lender~ 
In~ eve,nt9fioss. Bon'o~¢i ~;lll give·4.m.ier·•ei;liatonotice by mail. I..ende:r.may;m~ yroofofloss if 
not ·m.ade 'promptly by'Bom~w.er: .~c}l jnsµranc!;' company· CQnceyiied ·is hei:eby authorized and directed to. roaire 
payment fcir.sucb: loss dir~tly Jo tender, instead of to Borrower and. toLe~clerjo~tJy ~ AU-or any·part ·of~ msµrance 
proceeds,may be applied by Lender, aHts tip1ion,. either (aJto 1he.reductiort: of ihe' indebtt;d1;1e~s under $e Note:~d this 
:$.~~-. Jns-e.rit; ·"QI"St lo any d~queilt ~ou:nm apP.lie<f in the order of '.Paragrap~· 3~ and tlllfil to ·prepaY,111ent- of 
principalj o.r:@) t<1 t;be~tora1ion. or.re.pair ofth~.damaged property. NJY appli~ati~ ofthe proceeds.to the:prlncq,al 
·shall not .extend or posipane the due da.re of the monthly paymeAts wl)ich m-e.refeJre.d tofu Paragta:ph 2,. or c~.mge tJie 
amoqnt of sµcb ~ayµie~:ts~ Aw. eXces~:i~urance pr~s over an amount required to pay: ell oufsfancling indebte~~$. 
underthe·Nqte ~ 'this $.ec1;1µ,fy Inst;r.uni~nt .s1i:a1L~ p~d:to ~ e:mi.171¢galil' :entitled ~to. 
fu•fu.e ewnt of foreclosure ofthi$ ~:uri.ty Ihstni01ent or 9tbe.r •f~ o.ftitleto the Property .thatexlinc,cruishes. 
the .qid~bt~es$, all rlght1 title. and intei:-esfofBorrowerin: and to insurance._poijcjes inf9rce,$all pass to the pu,rc:fi~, 
5, Q¢cupancy• Pt~ervaJi;<~n,. M~~n~n~. ~nq ):'Toteetfon of' the. PtoP'erfy~, ~rrowe.r!s Loan 
Application; 'Leasel1olds.. Borrower shall ~c'¥Y,· ~sfabl;isl4 and u;;~ ~ Pm.P¢Y l!;S· Bon:ower's pii:ncipal ·residen~e 
·)Yi~ shay days after 'the:execution of thfa Secui:ity insh-wnent ( or vruhin $4y i:l~ of.a. late:r $..l¢ Qi" iransfei- _of tb,e 
:PJ'Q,Peey) .~d sii~w~tlnµe to ,<><::l?UP:ttµ_e~.¢.rtt·~ Bottower's,p:iincipal.resi~e.nre for llt least:oneyew ~-the date 
o( occupancyi: :µiµess .L~n~er ~e~~ '1£i~t ,reqwn,me.Qt will cause undue hardship for• Bam:iwex; or :uriiess 
extenuating ·cm:umstances ~which me beyond Boirow~ cqntr,oJ.. ~orrawer.:~h~l n<>tify L,ender :of any.ex:t.enuatfug 
ci(clijllstances. Berro:wer shall not.commit waste or dbstroy .damage o.r S1.lbstan~y chang~ thf Property: Qt a11ow-1he 
l'rop~.rty to 4~tenora~~1 :re~9~a~l~ ~~*·$.cf '.leaf ·expected. Lender may insplitthe Property Jf'th.e Pr6perfy is vacant or 
abandoned or the loan: is jn ,d.efault Len~er mey take @.!Sonable action to protect and preserve. .such vacant. or 
abarid.oned'P.ropelfy. Borrower shall also 'b.e in de.fault i,f'BOJ;f,ower,-durlng tiu., fo~~ppli~'(iojl proc~ss;_ giive mate~]y 
false or :Q,Utccurate.Efoiniatlon: or-statements io'Lender.(ar failed fo flro~d~T.e~~ with ~Ji]ate!1!ll ~?n<>it)'fn: 
~onnecdon mtb. the l~!Ui el'i°QeDc~~ ·1,y :the. if ote,. inc1uq~g, 1;,ut not limifucl t~~ tepr~sentationi;· C.O.Q.r;:,mring_".aprrow;r'~ 
occu,pancyof tA~. J>rpp.efo/. as a.Ptw.~ipitl . residence. If tltis Se9'1rity lnstrujjleni is on 1easeho~d; Eorrow~ 'Shall comp1y. 
with the pto:visions of the lease. IfBili:rower acg_u~s fee. .title to the'Ptopei:tY, "P.ie le_a,sehgl~ ~c,t fee titl~ ~ n,~t be 
:iAe,rged tiµle~ Lend.e.fagreesto :the.merger hnvntfug. · · 
6~ °CQJ1de~11?-ti~~ 'J;'he ptQce~gs·,pf',aizy -a\y!fi=a of claim.for damages► direct or conse.quenri~ in e;o.rmection 
with any, ,90ll®]Jll)iJ.tio~ .or .oth~r ,taking ~f ~y ;Pait of the.l'r(jp~rcy; ;of for conveyance in _pl~e of CQndemnatiort, at~ 
herehy- a$Slgnr;,4 ancl ~hall b.e pidd to Lend~ to. th~ ,~xtfm! Qf th~:iWl :~ount ofjhe iiidebfedness th~h.eiliains unpaid 
llliaciI .. the· Note· antLthis .Securi~ Instrument Lendex: sh.a1l a.PPly sµch Jll'.'Weed~ t~ the req\lctf~ •of the ~~ep_rechiess 
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~er the:.Note and this S~tuity -~ent, "first ~o any de~quent a,µounfs appli~ iii_ the o~eqtrovideil in Par~pn 
3~ 'and th~* to prep~ym~.µt qf P~P~ _Aljy applicatirm.of.th~ proc~_eds to-th~ i>p,ticipiil ~l).lot ~xt$d.wpQSfpone 
:t:Qe gue g~te of the.niorithly-payment.s,- :wlµch are ref~4 fo. mP.aragraph,2, ·9r qhange ffie-·tm101:1nt of such :payments • 
. .f'i,ny-excess·_pro~~s _over ·an amount reqllfre(l tc, p~y :al{ outstanding "incle~ess -llllder the :Not~ an4 -arls· Security 
-Jn.stmmept shalJ bep_aidio the entity legally entitled thereto; 
1;. Charges to _:lJor.rower and. Protection: ofLe~uiers ;Rigqts iii" tJie.l'ropeJV. Borrow.er shaJJ ·pay i1IJ 
goyem.µ1~nM 91 m~~lpai -~- tipes· ~d impq~ti,ons th~t are.:not-fucNd~~ in Pan,igi'aph 2. ~o.r;row:ei shall _p~y 
· these- pJ;ijgations 011: tim~· cl~ctly to the e.ntiiy which js ·pwed. 1he payment, If fail~ t~ :P.ey WQnld adv~sely affect 
Lenders mterestitr-fhe . l>roperty, upon Le.nder's request Bo.trowel'"..sliali promptly fur:riisb to tender feceipts evi'ae:ncmg_ 
thes~ pay1ffei)ts. 
If Borr~ fiuls, f9-~ .ili.es~ payments m: tlie. paym~ ~quir¢<l ·'kj, PiUag1¥.h Z: or f~ to: perfol__Dl any 
other .coveruu:its ~cl ,~ements contained in: this.· Security ~ent, or tlm.re is a JegJ!l proceeding that· may· 
sigriilicaotl_y affect Lenders rights in the Property (such as a. _proceeding in bankruptcy,.for .conde;mnation or to enforce 
Jaws ~-re~affons), then Lender may :do and pay, wh~ver is: necessary .to pro,tec~ ine value_ or -~~ '.Property iµ1d 
l;entjer'~ tj.ghts iti.:the;E>rop¢y~.includiµg payment of taxes, b~ ~-ati~ e1tfiet ~~rn;ienti~ed in Panwap.h2 . 
. Any amounts disbursed_ by Len4~ ;"Qnqer this Paragrapb. she]{ ~e ~ :acfqiti()Jlf!] d~t pf Borrqwer and be 
secured by .this Security Instrument These amounts shalLbeai :interest-from the daf.e of cli.sbUJ$emenf, at. the. Note rate, 
and at the option of Lender,._ sbal1 be ~~iltely'_ ~ue a:rul_pliyable~ · . . 
. . . Bom,~er shall promptly 4isc~ any li~n.whic:h):ias prjolity over~ltlt~.¢~zy. ~~llt~~ 1:lo~wer: 
(a)-_agµ'les Al wrliµig-,t:Q the1~a~eijt pftne:ql>li~tion.~med _by '.th~ Hen in a, mannerac~pt~Je. tot.ender; (b).confe~ 
in g9od faith the lienby, or defends· a_gainst'eiuorceme.nt of the lien in, l~gal pr«.eedin~ wl}icn in the umder's opinion 
operate:to preventilie. ~nt:"orce.ment oftheJie.n; oi (c) secures fro~ ihe holder-of1he lien an agreement sat.isiactcuy to 
L~n.der ~u"<>.llfinatiilg_tne li~n: to this ~¢cnrlty In~mifuent- Jf LencJer d~ter.lnme$ 14~ any part .oftl;e ~r<;>perty i_s subject 
to· a lien w.hjch .IlUo/ att:aln priority. oy~ .tlµs Se~µri~ Instrnm:ent, Lender may gfye Bprrow~--~ n.otice ·iden1:ifying· the 
lien. Borrower shall satisfy the lien ot take one .or more of the actions set forth:above within Jo· days. of the givmg of 
.notice. 
8~ Fees. Lender may collect _fees aJ)d _charges al}(hori~ by ~ S~~tmy. 
9. Grounddor.-AcceJeratfon:ofDebt 
(a) De.fault. Lender may, except as limited by regulations issued by tQe Secretmy· in the-case of payment 
defaults, require· immediate payment m·full of~ .sums ~cured by tins Secnrity-Instrumentif. . 
(i} Sdr.i:l>~~r ~~fanit,s by fi!lling 10 pay fu fuII any ~onthly payment rajwred by tid~ 
· ~ecarity lnstr.ument_prior to' Qr pnJbe d~ .da~ o.f the ne~ monthly payinerit~ 9r 
(ii) Bom~Wer defaults bY, failing, for a period of Um:ty· d~A to perfonn any .other 
.ob~igatlo:os ~il(~ m thl~S~cQrity ~il~ . . . . . . 
(b) Sale·Wit~q-ut C,r~~~ .4ppr~v.al. l,~der·sha)~ if permitted .by applicable law (iiwluding ~ction Hl(d) 
of the G~•St Gemiafu:De_pository IristitutiQns,Acrofl9.82i 12 u.s.c~.§: 17.0lj-3(d)) and.with ~(tprlcir approval-of-qte 
Sectetazy, require imniediate-paymeilt"fu fulfof all the ·stuns :secure.d by this.Secµrity Instrument if; · 
- (i,) Al1 or part of-the Ptoperty;. or: a :l>e.tieficial inretest in a trust owning• all or·part of the 
Property, is soJd or othenvise·ti:an.sferfed (9ther tni$ by devise or descent),? and 
(il) J'he Property is '.]J.Ot :0ecupi~- 1;iy ~ ffi.ir.c~¢t O{ gr~e ~s hl~ or' hei prh,icipal . 
residence; or tlte pwchaser or-grantee. do~ ~o occupy :th~ .Property, -but µls ·9r lier ~tlit h~ nof ~.Q. · 
-approved in acc<5tdante with the.t.equtreroe.ilts ·oft.liti Secretmy. 
:'(~J N~rW~iver. If circumstanc~s o~~ur th!:lt wowi:f-~it Len~r to, require immediate payment in mu, l>;ut 
Lender doe~ not·req1.µre su~h·pay,ments, Len.aer.do~ 11ot waive:its rights ·with respect to subsequeAfoi7~nts. 
(d) geguiations .~f HUD Secrebu:r: In many ~llmStances ~gulaµ~nsi~ued. by"the.S~will limit 
lender's .tjghfs. fu ihe-ease.of payment defaults; to requife·nnmediate pzy.ment in .full and foreclose if-not paid. This· 
Security Instrµmelit'cfoes not authoriz.e acceleratfon at fb.reclqsute if not petmi«ed byi'egu]atlon~ of~e Sbcretruy. . 
( e) ,Mortgage Not bis~. Bori'ovrer agre~s. that if 1his ~ecurlty fustj:rim,lfut mid. the No~ .?J'e npf ~~~ed 
to be eligi"ble for insurance lUlder 1he National Housing Act w.ithin-6.0 day~ from the <late here9f,· Lender may~ ~- its 
option require immediate. payment m.full ohill sums secured by tlrls Security In~trun:i~nJ. A "Wlltten s;tatemenf of'any 
aDthorlied agent of ¢e Secretary dated sµbseque~t to 60 days from the date Jiereo~ declining to insure this SecUrity 
Loan No~ .802~1000025 
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his~el!t .~d-~e)'J9Jt; ;~Jtall ~ ,4~¢e~ CQn¢lusiv.i;: proqf of..~uqh in~ii'gt"bility.. No:twltlisrancimg ·.~.fotepg, ~s 
·opµQilJ:!J.ay not be ~xe~i~d l,ly Lender when the un.ayailab~- _of insllr~ce;.is-,.solely due tc, Le~~er!s µthtre to Temit a, 
m·ortgage ins.1.n;mce premium:to fu:e:s·eoretmy. · · 
. ·-10; Remsiatement. Borrower has a right to be rem.stated jfLender has requireu irn.l:nediate payment in.full 
· b~use 9fBt¥roW~.r~ faµ~ to pay ;3J.l $:t}o1.U1t.du~·under the-Note 9r ~~~ ~c\?PtY: I~ent. T1tj_s ~f ¥.P1~,r~ye.i,: 
~er foreclosure proce~gs:~-~f:Uted~ Tore~ate.the Secuti,ty rnstrurp.ent, BQ.r.rOWe,t $bilJi.tend~.fu ~i°lumP. sll.Dl 
all ·amo'llllfs_'.req~:tobring BQJrPWei's account-current incluaing to the exte11t they ijie obligafion~ ofB9rr.ower. und~ 
thili: Sec~ty Tostrwn~ roieclos.ure oosts and reas~iilile ·and• cusfu~ary· attorilo/.si . fees .and expenses properly: 
~~ociated. "4th -~ (ot~I~~tire pr~~ing~ l.Jpqn -,n:instate~~nt ~Y :BQm;>W~i- this Security Inspiiiµe.n.~ ~~ t~ 
obJi&ations: :dliit jt S!;:Cµt"e$ sb,aJI remain in effect .as ·jf~n4e:r, ~ ,not required imme.diate .P.~tment in:full ·mnv~vei:? 
Lender is .D.ot re:quired. to. pennii reinstatement if: (i} Lender-:has accepted reinstatement after the commencement: oi 
:foreclo~e proceedhigs withbi two :years· ~ecliateJy- p~~dfug: the· ccmilne_ncemem of .a _cttr.rent: forecfosme: 
·p;r9ceeding,. (ii) ~iii~~tepi~.i)t- will. ~lude· f9r¢clos~ pn· diff~rent _groUJ;lµs' ~ .the future, -or {iii) :.relll~ateinent ·wm, 
advcr~Jy affect the priority of the lien,~qreaf:ed_ by ~ .~t.nity ,Instrument ·· 
11. Bof!OW~r·Not Released; Forbear;uiee b:y Under Not a.Waiver. Ext~on ofiM tim:e of payment-or 
modification of amortization of the· 5UJJis :secured by this Sect~ insti'timent: granfed by Lender to any successor in 
interest• .of Be>-m>V!'ei'_ sb!lll nQt ope,ate 'to)'e1$fi· :the· _iiabtmy of the (?Ii.gin.Bi :/3onower ~r Borr~wer's. ~uccesso,r in 
inie~st. Lend~.r -~h,all nqt be regmred to' comm~.Qce proceedfu~ .against' ~y s~c.ccs,;;or_in 11)1ei:est or ~tilse Jo ~*.nd 
time forpaym,~nt or otherwi11~, modify ,amQrti~ipn of tbe s:ums sec~cl by. this. S.e~~ .Instrument,by. ;re~on -of aw 
demand made cy the- orlgmai ·Bm:r.ower o:r BOirowei's su.ccessots lil interest Any foib.e.arance by Lender in:exercising 
any rig1it or-remedy.shalhiot bo fwaiyet of or ]#eplud~~ e~~tcj.~ of BJJY right:or remedy; 
. 1.21. ,S.i,.ecessor~ ~d ,As~- Bound; ·.10J~t .~d. Seveni] L1~billty; C~g,tte~. Th~ CQVen~ts and 
agreem,ents. of this Sec.urity Instrument' .shall •Jjind and benefit tb,e su.cce~sp~- and as,sigm~ of 4'ild~r ~d BOJrower, 
subject to the prowioqs of Paragraph 9(b ). Borrowetii' oo:vei:umts and agreaine.nts shall be joint: and several. Any 
Bottower who- co,.signs this: Secupty J~eµ~ but c1q·es not execute the ~i;itez (a) is. ·oo,.signing this Sec¢ity 
.ms~Jl.t o-11Iy .to $®gage;_ p.it imtl c.anvet :tfii¢: ~on'6}ver~ ilitere~ in tli~ fr~ W}der the te~ .of~ Security 
~nt; (b) i$ no( pe;rsp~ t:tJ:;.ligated ta: pay the· su~ ,s~_c.ur~~ by th~ -~:arity {nstrnment; c!lld: (c)-.agre.es th~ 
lender and .any other Borroweimay·agre.e to extentt modify, forbear or make anyaccommpd11tipns with°.regatd to the· 
ttnn of tins ·&cmity ln.stniment otthe_Note 1y.ith:o1it ~t ~on;t>wers consent 
p, Notices, 4ny no~ce Jo B9u-Qwer provltiecl .for in this Securtty:Jn~trn.m~.µt s~l b~ _giv¢.~ PY .*.liverm,g it ' 
or 'by mai.H~_it,b;y firsJ class-mail unless appiicabl~ law reqµfres use of anQil)en;nethod. The. n9tice. ~ be directed· to 
the P..r::ope.rty Adclress .. or.any othet·ooc1:ress Borrower desigiµites o/ notice ft? Lender .. Alrf notfoc fo. Lender shaIJ be 
giv,:~ 1?.Y- in:~t das~ P.J,ail ~ :µmd~'s address stated~ o.r ~Y aclih.-#.ss µndet designates by-li_otice to Bog9~er. Al}y_ 
:no~ce proyjdedJ'or it;l:t:bis S~ty-Instrument sh.all be doomed to have.been giye~ to· B'oir~et or'l~;n.iier w~e.11 gi~ 
as provided m this paragrapll.. · • · 
i 4.: Governing Law;-Sever.alJil1ty; TiifiSecurlfy. Instrument sb.~t be governed by·Federal law and theJaw,of 
the jurisdiction fu whlcli the Ptopelfy is'Iocateci: 1n:fue ere,iiqhat·any-provision:or cianse of this Security JAmQrilent o:r 
1Ije·l:'fQte .ce>ilfiiqs·wi~-ajl~c.$1~ !_11,wt' $Ubh: .coilfli_!?f: shail 11ot. ~t ot;µerpro.yisio.µs o(tbis·Security Instrwnent .pdh~ 
~ote which can be;given eff~twjfbout the ~onfµcting provision.. To tms end the provisions of this Se~ ~nt 
and the Note are decl~d to be ~verable, · 
15. Borroweti~ Copy. Borrower shall be .given one confonned copy. of the ,Note and of' this Secllllty 
:instrument. · 
. :t6; Hazar~ous Substances. Bo.rrow,er sh~I ;n.ot ca~~, _or petm,if 1he pi'~nce.f ~, _(ij?}>9sal. ~rage; or 
release pf any 1Iazar:do~ Substances .on· orin the- Property. Borrower-~~ nQt 4.oJ nqr allow ·anyQDe' else to do, 
anything affecting the.Property that km violation of any Enmmimental Law. The _pr~g two·~niences shall.not 
appiy w ~e p~~~e~. ~ Qi:~omgtj ¢.i. tqe, Pr.oper.f1 of· sni~I qu~~es o~Hazardous Substances that are ge~etally · 
~o~ to·b.ei)J)j)ropriat.~ loJioim&l.~sidenµ~. useg•and to maint.e~ o(tl,1¢ PI:wny, . .,. 
Borrower snail promptly ;give Lender wmten· notic!) f)f· a:ey m:vestigf\UOn;, plaiql. <l,emandJ ~suit or pth~ 
action by any goveJJiiiJ~.tital orreguhrtciiy agency or·privaie"party :involving tJle Pi:~rty :and any-~dotJS Substance. 
or -Environmental Law of whibli· '.Borrower has actual ·1mowledge. 'lf Borrower 1eams1 or· is; notlfi«.f by aiiy 
gq:,/etWA~J1fal or re~~ozy ·~utho:rity, that a,µy tem~vaJ of c,ther-jemediatiaii oC:an)tHazartious Substances affecting t1ie 
roan: No: so2-100002s ..... . 
~ iita,h *r:ulit.f .Inm:umenf~S.*difi~~) . 
~~ C~MH.~~S9tm.,q.,.JNc,-
WWY1:oompr1A11i:<:~:>111c,,,ccm . 
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.Pl'.op~rty fa necessazy, Boi;rower sbal1 promptly Wee.~ necessary remedi&l ~l)ris fu acoorda,n~e with Envii'Qnmentai. 
.Law. · · · 
· As used m this'- Paragraph. i'(j;_ "H~atdous Sµbstances~, are .1hose s11bstances defined as toxic- .or hazardous 
:sub$Jces by tµyiro;aµt~~µd_Law !lnd-.fi!e fo.lle>vroig_~~b~~; ~line, kerosene; ·other flammable or ~q 
pe1;rQlyUni F,~qcts, tQ~c pesticld~ ancl he,rl;dci~es, 'VQlc1tile ·so~ rii.&ten~ ~faining its~~~ or fOllilalpe;hycte, 
and ·.radioactive. material~ Mused ,in tw Paragrapb 16,.-'.''Envirorunenqil Law') ]]ie~ &icl~ lmv~ 'anQ laws, ,of the 
· · juclscfictfon: where tlie Pr.operiy isJocated that relate to heilltli, safety or environmental p.rotecfi011; 
NON.:.UNIFORl\.:l CO~NA.N'.f:S. Borr9wer~d L~il~er furfh~:¢c;>Ye~'tti:ri~ agr~ as follows: 
1 "f. A~gnment. 0.f Rents; Borr9Wer Wlconditfonally assi_gns :an9 transfers tQ Le;nder all .the rents; and 
rev.e.nues of pie ·Ptop·e.rty... Borrower authorizes Le.nde:r oi iendels: agents to collect the reJ1ts and revenues and 
h~re~y q~c,S -~l_i.-ttj:t@t qfthe:Pr9p_eny to p~y_tlii, rents to Le~a~ w.L~P.d~1s agents. Hoirever,.prlorto Lei:tdtj"'s 
notice· to Borrow~r of'Borrower'.s .bi~ach of any covenant or agreement in :the ·secm:ity Insti'wnent '13orrqwer, ~B:1,l 
collect and recejve all rents and ,revenues· of the Property as truste.e for. the benefit of _Lt,nder arid Borrower. 'This: 
.~ignm~.nt of rents coi;l._s,titqt¢$ ~ a~s9il;lf~ ~sigrimt?ntatid nqt ~ assigmg~:!i.f .f~ additiona.i securrty. only. 
· !(Lender gives notice oftire~b to Bql]"OW~ (a). aU :re~ re~ived· by:B011ower shali be li«#by B9.rroW~r 
as trost~ for .benefit·of Lencler on1y ~ to be _applied 1o -the SW31$. secured. bY. the.Secu.r,i.ty' Tnstrtinlent (b) Le~~uhaU 
be entitled io collect and receive all of the· rents of the .Property; and· {c) .eacll tenant- of the Jlrope.rty· $hall pay all 
te,:nts due· .and unpaid to t.e.ncier or Lendei'~ agent 01tLendels written demand-to.the tenant 
.. ·· BQ'JJ"ower Ji~ iot ~~c1J1~~ ~ priqr assignment c>f th.~ r~nts l;!l,i~ Jil!S -~at and '.Will-not pe1forin any act that 
W9rJld prevent Lend~r fi:qril.~xe~ii!lll8 jts rlghts·under. thfs Pa.ra,grapb, ·11 •. 
Lenqer sh~t ··not be·reqrifred to -~ter· up.on, take c.onfr.or of or m$~.th~ Prqperty l,efore or after giving 
notice :of breach to Borrower. However, Lender or ajudfo1a11y appointed .re.ceiver may do-so ~t any time there. is. a 
bre.~h. ,Any app~icatfon of ~nts shall not .c~~ .or ~iliye ,any .default :or invalfdate ·any otliet :rlgbt or remedy .of 
Lender. This·as.si,grwient ti(rents of the Property ~l;la:11 terminate when ili~ del!t seemed byih* Sec.WitJ m$iP:nem is 
p~fu~ . . 
i& Forecfomre .Procedure If Lender ;reqwres immediate pay)llent, -~. full :1,inder Paragr.apJi ·91 
l,,ender iqay imrok~-tJte p~er of'saJe,a~d- any olher reiµedies permitted by appli~ole Jaw. Lender s~all -be 
~ntitled to ~oJiect ~ll· ~pen~es incurred :in, pursuing tlte r.em_edi~ ptoYifled j~ this ·y~grapll i_s;_ in~J{ding, 
but no·t fimited tq, reaso11able attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence. 
if'tlle power of ~Je1s:invoked; Trustee sbalfexecute a wrlden notice or-the occw-_rence oho event of 
default·- an_() qf. l~e electiQn t9 cau~~ t~e Prop~ey to l>¢ soit1 ~i,,d ~~ai.J :record such· notice in each county- i~. 
which any part' of th~ Property js Jo~ted •. Lend~:r or Tnrst~e shall mail copjes of suc'b ~ofi~.~ t~e manner 
prescribed by applitabie Jaw to llorro.w.er and: to;the other persons prescn"'he4 by appJJ~bl~ Jaw. In-. th~ eyent 
:Bo'rro~,.~r: d~es not cure the default witiun. tlie period .then _prescribed by ~ppJj~ble iaw, Trusiee slia11 give 
p9blI~ :u,otic~· of-th¢ :$.~e- to .th~ per~oi.ls ~:rid ~n tlie :ma~~et J>r~crlbed by. applicabie Jaw. After the time 
reqttir~ 11:Y ~pplfoabJe:Jaw, Tr:ust.ee,·witJiout cJ~mal)d ()n Ir.orrow~r, ~~I ~ell tl~e·P.ro_pertf at pubij~·anctio)( to 
the highest bidder at. ilie' time· and. place u.tider the t~r.ms.· designat(ld tn. i_~e potice- ·ors.al~ .i~ one or more 
p·arcels and in any .otiier• t.rustee. determines .(but subject fo -a·ny statutory riglit· of Bot.rower tQ -direct the 
or~er _m_ :w1Q¢~ ·tJ_ie ,Prop~:rty, if co~~sting ,of.several '.known Jots ,or :parceis, shall .he sold) •. Trustee may; in 
accordance·wit1-.appJicabl~ Jaw, p~stpone ssle:ofall 9r-any parc•ei _tjf th~ Prop~rzy by pubiit ann·~~c~e~t-at 
the tim¢ an:d place of-2,my previously scliedwed ·saJe.· Lender or-its designee-niay purc~~e llieP,operty at .any 
sale.. 
Trustee s!tali d~liver (9 the 'p:iµ"~a$er Tru~~ee•s dee.d conveyi11g; the :Property Without any covenan~ 
or warl;'anty, _expressed o_l." implie~ 'J'he recitals jn. ihe Tnis~e's de¢ .. shall ~e ppma :fa~~ ev1dence of the 
.tru.tb. of the _statement.$ :made there.in, Trustee sh~II ~ppJy the pro~_eds o( :ihe sa~e in tb~: foJJowJng: order~. 
_(~) to all expenses of the salt;; focJudi'ng, bot not li:m1teil fo; :reasonable Trustee~s and _attorneys' tees; (b)'t(;-aJJ 
~~~~ -~ec~r~d,).ytJi,is Security rnstrlUHent;. and (c)·.any exces's'.to the person .. or: persons legally entJtled fo it or 
to the ~o"(lnty ~~rlt of the county in w_hfcb the s~l¢tQo}c. place. . . . 
If the Le_,der's.· i»terest ·i,11. Uris -Security mstrumeilt: ,is ·held PY (Jie Secretary and the .$ecr.eJary 
requires immediate· payment !•:a- full m1d_et Paragrapn 9, 'the S~cretary 1µa;jr h1voke th.e no~judi#al pow.er of 
IDan. Nb: 802-1000025 
. FaA,ilta~ Security im~mcnt(MERSM?diflcrl). 
-Dre ~~CE $Ql7llC~ JNc.-
·ww,-t1XUrflizinca""""'.toDI 
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sale. P.f pvidell in t~e Sin;le ;F~mily, .1'4<1r~age_ Fpreclosqte Act .of ,1994 (" Ac~) (1.2 :'(!,$.~- § 37~· d gg.), ~y 
requesting a. fQr.eclosur~ commissioner- designated -under the .Act to coiµm~n~- fotecJosure ·and to sell tlle 
Pi:<>perty·-as p3:ov~de1lin._tlie.;A-ct No(hiiig}n tiie· ptececling sent~nce_sban deprive, tli~ Se_cret;1ry oi'anr :r.igh~ 
-ofhef;w'i~~ ay~~ll!W~ ,o ai~.n~er .,~der·f]µ~.far.agr~ph 18 o·r appl_foablelaw.~-
i9. ~;conv.~y~i:i~~ ·Upon paymtajt .. of ~I ,sums ~eciµ'~ "bi thl~ =sec:;up~· ];ilstrument~ Lender shali request 
Tr1.1stee -to recan:vey the Ptoperly 1lllP _$hall $urtendpr ~ Securljy ~~em ar;i~ -~) ntjtes ~-v.idtmcijl.g d~qt s~cu.r¢~ 
by this• Secui'icy lnsirument ·to Trus.tee; Trnsfoe ,shall ·reoonvey the Pr.operty· w.~thput w~~:ty. (o· 1h~ p~r$OU' :or 
per.sorts )egally- entitled .to it _Such pets$. ~r"J;*~~~ $hall PIO' any reco.rdation costs~ Lender may charge- such. 
peI'SOll or_pe.i'so~ ·a fee fop~cori~ffeg $e l'°.rqpertyj put o~-if tJi~.f~ is pmd to a third:PartY (such as tne-Trustee) 
fo,r services.i;eµdereµ.-and the ch,arging ofthe·Jee js nermitted nndet np_pijca,ble I~~- . . · 
2-0. .SJihsfJiute Trustee; Lender, at: its cption, may from. time to. tµµe re.m.c;we Trustee, ~d appoint- a 
successor trustee to. any ·T:rustee aj>j>oint~-<f hcreun~e;. Without co.nveyam:;~ .of.the .Properly, the.6uccessor trustee 
sllall :s1ic¢.e~ ter ajl,: th~ ti~e; pt:rw~i~d ijuti~s CQn.ferred µp9ri-T~~~;h¢~~iil m1d,by ap~licablelaw. 
z:n~ 'Re~est fe>r .N0,ticesr Borrower ~ques~ that' copi~: :e>f th¥ nptic_es pf gefau"4 -~d sal~ .be ·se~t -to 
· Borr.owet1s address whicli is the Property· Address. 
. 2i. ji,iers to .tJrl~ s·ecurlcy ~ils(tument. If· one ot more riders are. execu~d :by Borroww .and recorded 
toge~er with thls Sec.wity IQ.sfru,ment tlle ~ovepants,of eac:b, su~h rider shall be 1ncotporate.d_ into and shall amend 
and su_pple.tneni th~ -co.venants cµrd ·agreements of th,is Secµri,ty ,lits(nllneiit as if (lie ddet(s) ·w~.r~, a p~ of :@.s 
Security !nstnmie¥.. (Check:appiicable'box(es))~ . · · - ·· · . . . 
0' C.ondonrinitrili Rider 
~ Pl~ed Unit,-Devei~pment Rider 
D :Other [specify] 
□- Or@ga.~4 :payment Rider 
0 GrO)Ving Egmty :R.id.er 
BY Siq~G. :BE):.OW, ijqtrqw~r~9.~pts ~d agrees to the ~.mis .and covenants. contained-in tlµS.Security 
I:nstrµm~tand ill ~y rider(s) executed'by Bor.rowe.r and recorded ·Willi -i~; 
Wft:nesses: 
!ban No: :86.t lOOboiS . 
~ '7f;l'1 ~w#y ~~~~~i~Moal_fi=d) 
-~ _c;q~~SQJJ,\le~~C,.--
WWW:complbuicea~.c:om 
----------..:..:....._.;...:.....,....,_~- ($eaj.)-
-.Bcnowi:r, 
_______________ (S~ai) 
.:.Borrowei 
-....:..--------....----,-------- (Seal) 
-Bao;t!WU 
Q 
Sfate of 
20070:044838 09/u6/2007 .03:-35,39 PM 
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. The foregoing mstrume~t was acknowledged ·before m~ this g Io_ I I ?iJ_n- . 
(dat~).by SAMQEt D. ADAM.SON . 
• • 
IDanNo: 802--1000025 
FHA '()'tAh Seeut#y.~irllllierit (MER~ ModJijed) 
-Trot CoMPµ'ANCE SOtnlt:!E:, JNc.~ 
wv,w.c,0mpliuiecsovrQ,.am, 
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1: ....  FHA_,_. _·_ease_: -·_,Ni_~_:, _s2_1-_G_43_96_J_ci-_:i_os_· _ ___,, ' 
FHA PLANNED UNIT DEVELOP.MENTRID.ER. 
·oos,· PL~D U:N1T. J)E~t-O?MENT WO~R 18 II$~<;:· tlu~ 31st dw' Qf 
. .Au.911st r 10 07 ,. and is. .ittcm:porated. 'mto and .&ball ·be deemed to amend ~ supplement .the 
.Mo.t'.tglige, Dee4 of Tro,:st 9t S~titr ,De~d f"Secmfty Jnst¢.w.e,Iiti') of W. ~e !{a.~ gi~eh by the. 'iµide,rsign_eq 
(
11
.B.oirower~) to secure Borrowers Nofe to GUIID -~- COJ.i,:1PANY, . A, CALI~ 
CdRPORATION 
( 11Len~er{') o,f th.~ sa.ine dare-a~a tj)veiiil.g $.e;Prqpeey·d~~¢b·~ Pi,~~-Se~ty lnsm,un~nt ~.located at; 
70 W. ·QR,Caz®) LANE, WE~, ill' 84.780 · 
'[Property Address/ · · 
The Property Address is ?- part· of ~plaimed unit.tltj,ei$.llentfiPtJDil) known as 
TaE FIELP$ 
{Name of Planned Unil Dey~Jopmen(! 
Pl)JJ COVENAN1$; In .adclitlqn to. the .~oveJJall~ ~d. ag¢el)leii.ts. maq_~ )n tll~ Securicy I~trumen.t, . 
. Borrower and Lender furl.her covenant and agree as follows! . · . 
A. So iong as the Owneis Association (or equivalent entity holding tille. to c0mmon. .areas and 
fa~liti.es), ·:ac:µI,lg as tmstee for th~· ho.weqwners., :iti~~A~, with,~ genetany f:i~~{e4 i~ce 
canier, a 11.master1' or 11olan1cet1-· policy ittsnrfug, the property locafud in file Pup', •including all 
:imprqy~~- now .~xisting or•Ji:~eaftei: etroted on 1;b,e w.prtgageg, p:rem~~ and, such policy 1s 
satisfactory, to .Lender and prov.ides insuranc.e· coverage: fo .the. .mriO• for the periods, and 
.aMJpsl th<;i hazards Lemier; :r:equites; :mcludi,iig fire-and oth¢t lfµru:$. included Witliµi tb,e• term , 
11extended coverage'' aitd .loss by flood, tb' the extent iequire4 l>y ~ :Secretm:y; then; ·(i) Le~der 
~es the J?ril:visicm. in P~ph. .2 of. ,this s~urtty· ~ep.t :fo,i;- th¢ ·1119:ntl»y pa:y,m.~t to 
.Lender of one-twelfth of the yearly premium installments for.hazard in,surance .on-11ie Property, 
anQ (iO B9µ:<rw.~s ~bl,ig~~J} und~ fai:a~ 4_ :ti¥~- Se(;Ority histrµnient to ma:hiµu:µ. haz~a 
in~ ·coverage on.the :Propercy is d~me·d'satisfied to the e~~~_that_ the req_ufu:;d covera~e is 
ptovidea ·py·r;he· n~vners As~otj~tfon. PQlicy; Bcittower shall give Leildet prompt notice of a:ajr 
lapse in. l'equired hazard :insurarice coverage· and of any loss . oc~~~ :frci~ a h.azarcl. In' the 
~vent of a .. ~tno1,it,io1r Qf ~ in~n:c;e pio~eeds 'lll Ji~ of restoration .or repair .followmg a 
lo$ to the· property or to comm.011 areas .atld (apilities of tlie J'UD, any px:oceeds paya.ol~ fo 
Bt?l!9wer. aie, lieieby ::iBsigne~-ahd shall be 1j'aid ·to tender for application:to ·the sw:ns ~ed :by 
this Security ;Instrument-, with, any~ paid ·tQ the ei:itl.ty·le~y-~~-:the~, 
B. Boll'Q.wer pro.mis~ to·pay··a,11 .d:nes ?rid asses~~ts ~wposed p~rsnant to tne Jegat ins~eri~ 
.creating and goveririilgt.he POD. · 
C. Jf Borrower does not pay PUD. dues and assessmc:nts when: due~ t.&en Lender ma:y pay theI11; kry 
~~ dl&1.iJJrsed cy Lerui~r mideI' ·tbutparn~ph: 9 shall liecome-~diµonal debt of-Borrower· 
sec;ured by. the :Security Instru;Qle;nt. 1Jn.Ies~, ;Bp~wet- $1d ~der agree to o~r terms·. Qf 
payment, these amomiis shail bear interest from 1he date of disbursement at the:Noto rate and. 
shall'b~ p1,1yab~,· with, fufere~ up~n nofiece· fr9m teii4et to ;i;=icitfy)wer req,)estin~ji~yri,:Lent 
----,------------fS!gnatures<Jn Fpf/owlng_,Pii(!O',_..__,. _________ _ 
Loan No:· 802-1000025 
· l<'HA,~~ lmit Devlil~~eni ~ (MnW.sfate) 
.....,.niiW6.Ml"UANCE SoiJRCF;;-'.(~Cr---
Wjn'J'~OOIII' 
MIN: 10001'9980210000253 
Page·lof:t 
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BY 'SIGNING BELOW., Bol;'[owencc.epts and :agr~ to the term~ and Pitl:~Qns· cqrttllned in tbi~ ;E1UD 
I<lrier~. 
·(Seal) 
... Borrower 
(Seal) ($~) 
-Borrower -B~Wf/t 
-----''---'-----,.:------ 4Space·Be/ow thls UM.For Acknov.iledgmsnq ----------
tDan No:. so2 .... 100002s 
B.HA.P.lam1!!:d Unit Develop;nimt Rider (Multis~te) . 
-THE COMPl,JAN~$.ovii.cE,1NC.,- . . 
"!ffl'l'-~ccm· 
A-30 
. ,i 
After R:~corq,ing Retu:m to! 
RECONTRUST CO~ANV; N.~ 
43~0 Performance Dr; T.XZ-985-0.7.'..03 
,R.jc~a}'.dson, 'I:X 75082 
TS#.; .09 ,..q,d8i'SS-4 
TSG#: 5.-05:1603. 
DOC ro 200900.246'80-
Noti~e ofDefault.Page 1 of 2: 
Rus:sell .$h1~t~ Washington County Recorder 
0p.f.25/2-0Q.9 S)2:i34-:l4 PM F·ee $·12.00 By 
B~cl<rnart FPTP 
SP/l~AB.OYETHJS·LINEFQRRECO.RDER.'SUSE 
.NOTICE. OF DEFAULT.':AND ELECTION TO SELL 
Qn QJ: abQut AugusU 1, 2007, SAMUEL D. ADAMSON, A M.ARRlJ{D tv.rAN, .AS: HlS :SOLE A.ND 
$BP.ARA TE-PROPERTY, as Tr.ustor, executed .and deiiv~red to· SCOTT !:/()ND.BERG:; A MEMBER ·Of 
·THE UTAH STATE BAR as Trustee, for the· b.enefit o:fl\fORTO/\.GE ELE¢TRONIC::-REQI.S1'RATJON 
~YSTEMS,, JNC., as Beneficiary, a certain Trust Dee9 to .sec:ure the peiforinajlce QY th~ Ttustor of the 
-obligations under a Promissory No~. The Ttil~t De~d ·was recot~aj fo th.e Qflice pf the W~hin~on 
County Record~r, .as Instrument.No. 200700448.3~ 6Ti: :$~ptemb~r- 6; ~097 artd cover.s m~ following. reM 
property: 
.4J:;l, o:tJ ioT THIRTY oNE-:(31), THE Fmms -PHASE 'l; AecoRJ)J:NG 'fo THE ormc:rAL 
Pi.A'f THEREOF, ON FIL~ cy THE. OFFICE. OF THE RECORDlm. OF WA.SBlNGTON 
COUNTY, STATE OF urAir . 
Together with all th~ jmprovem~nt~ now or .nereaft.ei: .eteqt~d pn the property:> and all ~emellt$, 
apptfrteriance$) .and. fjxtw~s now or hereafter a part of the property. · 
MORTGAGa, $LECTRONIC REGISTRATrON SYSTEMS,. lNC. is presentiy the ·holder of the 
b¢11.efi¢ial° inter~$t unqer the Trust.Deed, ·and RECONTRUST. CQMPANYl N.A., is the trustee. A ·breach 
of ari :olJltgatipQ for Which the'trust property was. conveyed as secunty. h~ PC.CtJrr~.d. Payments are ·du~ for 
the months c:i:f January 200.9 through June 2009· in the .amount of,$I,6a0.29 p¥r 1~orrt.h, together\v.-th _any 
u-p.pajq 't.8l{e~;, i:Qsutance and other obligations· under th~ Promiss(>ry ·N9t~ a~d Trust bi~d~ Un<ler the 
pr6visfoi,"ts· of the Promissory Note and ·rrust Deed, the principal bafa.M¢ of $21~~06.96 is .acce.lerat~d · 
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No. 12-4150 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
RICHARD AND GWEN DUTCHER, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V. 
STUART T. MATHESON; MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, 
P.C.; RECONTRUST COMP ANY, N.A.; BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING LP; 
and BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., 
Defendants-Appellees, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Amicus Curiae. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE OFFICE 
OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COURT'S BRIEFING ORDER 
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") is a bureau of the 
United States Treasury Department charged with the administration of the 
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq., and oversight of the national banking 
system as well as the system of federally chartered savings associations. The OCC 
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has comprehensive authority over the chartering, supervision, and regulation of 
virtually every aspect of the operation of banks organized under the National Bank 
Act and other statutes, including 12 U.S.C. § 92a. 
The OCC is authorized generally to represent itself in litigation by 12 
U.S.C. § 93(d), comes within the authority of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
29(a), and has been invited by the Court to file this brief 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Under 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), what state does 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[] to" 
when a national bank based in one state serves as the trustee of a trust deed on real 
property located in another state? 
2. If the state 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[s] to" is not the state where the real 
property is located, may the national bank conduct a non-judicial foreclosure 
notwithstanding the fact that the state where the real property is located - while 
allowing a bank to serve as a trustee of real-property trust deed- permits only two 
types of trustees to conduct non-judicial foreclosures: 1) any active member of the 
state bar "who maintains a place within the state where the trustor or other 
interested parties may meet with the trustee"; and 2) title insurance companies that 
"actually do[] business" and maintain "bona fide office[s] in the state"? See Utah 
Code § 57-1-21. 
3. Is 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 a permissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a that is 
entitled to Chevron deference? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This amicus brief responds to the Briefing Order of the Court on May 31, 
2013, inviting the OCC to comment on any of the issues in this case, but 
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instructing that the OCC pay particular attention to the questions stated above. 
The OCC responds to those questions below. 
The regulation at the center of this case, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, governs national 
bank trust powers generally, and is not at all specific to the use of those powers in 
the context of a deed of trust and foreclosure. Because this case arises in the 
context of foreclosure, we preface our answer to the Court's questions by briefly 
addressing the role of foreclosure in the real estate lending process, and the OCC's 
enforcement role with respect to abuse of foreclosure processes. 
National banks have express authority under 12 U.S.C. § 371 to make loans 
secured by real estate. Section 3 71 also authorizes national banks to service loans, 
an authority that includes the power to foreclose upon collateral. See OCC 
Interpretive Letter No. 646 (April 1994) ("Lending includes not only the initial 
extension of credit but also collecting payments, foreclosing on collateral if the 
debtor defaults, and managing [acquired] assets."). It is well-established that 
national banks have the authority to acquire real property assets through 
foreclosure on loans or in satisfaction of debts previously contracted, and to hold, 
manage, and convey such assets in the course of their dealings. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 29 (Second), (Third). 
-3-
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The OCC expects national banks, in all aspects of loan servicing, including 
foreclosure, to comply with all applicable laws and have strong internal controls. 
When deficiencies have been discovered, the OCC has taken aggressive actions to 
hold national banks accountable and to get the problems fixed. In April 2011, the 
OCC, together with the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS,") took formal 
enforcement actions against 12 mortgage servicers, including Bank of America, 
for unsafe and unsound practices related to residential mortgage loan servicing 
and foreclosure processing. See News Release 2011-47 (April 13, 2011). These 
enforcement actions consisted of cease and desist orders requiring the national 
bank mortgage servicers to promptly correct the deficiencies. On February 28, 
2013, the OCC executed amendments to the cease and desist orders with most of 
these servicers. These amendments by the OCC (in addition to actions taken by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) have resulted in payments 
to-date of approximately $2.4 billion by the servicers to borrowers whose homes 
were in foreclosure in 2009 and 2010. See http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-
protection/foreclosure-prevention/correcting-foreclosure-practices.html 
(accessed June 14, 2013). Y Wrongful practices of the sort addressed in the 
11 The OCC has additionally issued guidance on the handling of imminent 
foreclosure sales to large and midsized national banks and federal savings 
associations, which requires servicers to review foreclosures prior to their completion 
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aforementioned enforcement orders are not at issue in this case, and, by filing this 
brief, the OCC in no way condones any unsafe or unsound foreclosure practices 
engaged in by Bank of America or ReconTrust. 
12 U.S.C. § 92a 
The statute at issue, 12 U.S.C. § 92a, is codified with the national banking 
laws, 'l! and states in relevant part: 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to 
grant by special permit to national banks applying therefore, when no( in 
contravention of state or local law, the right to act as trustee * * * or in any 
other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other 
corporations which come into competition with national banks are permitted 
to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located. 
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The succeeding statutory provision further clarifies the 
meaning of this text by specifying that when a state authorizes fiduciary powers by 
State banks, trust companies or other corporations which compete with national 
banks, the exercise of such powers by national banks "shall not be deemed to be in 
to ensure the servicer is complying with applicable laws and regulations and that 
approp1iate foreclosure prevention efforts have been made. Id. 
Y Section 92a was originally enacted as part of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 
and amended in 1918. fu 1962, Congress removed section 92a from the Federal 
Reserve Act and re-enacted it as part of a separate statute administered by the OCC. 
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contravention of State or local law within the meaning of this section." 12 U.S.C. 
§ 92a(b )."Ji 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7 
The OCC regulation at issue, amended in 2001, addresses situations in 
which a national bank conducts fiduciary business in more than one state. Section 
9.7 interprets 12 U.S.C. § 92a by specifying that: "The state laws that apply to a 
national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a are the laws of the 
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e). The 
regulation further specifies three core activities that detennine where a national 
bank acts in a fiduciary capacity: the state in which the bank "accepts the fiduciary 
appointment, executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and 
makes discretionary decisions" regarding the relationship. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). "If 
these activities take place in more than one state, then the state in which the bank 
acts in a fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state that the bank 
designates from among those states." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). 
~ The OCC has stated that: "Congress's purpose in adding section 92a(b) in 
1918 was to prevent states from preventing national banks from exercising fiduciary 
powers through prohibitory laws while allowing their own state banks and trust 
companies to have these powers." Interpretive Letter No. 695 at 11, 1995 OCC Ltr. 
Lexis 194, *33 (Dec. 8, 1995). 
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The Federal Register preamble ("the Preamble") to the 2001 amendments 
provides the authoritative OCC guide to the intended operation of the regulation. 
"Fiduciary Activities ofNational Banks." 66 P.R. 34792-01, 2001 WL 731641. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The OCC's interpretations of section 92a to resolve ambiguities or fill gaps 
are entitled to judicial deference under Chevron. Smiley v. Citibank (South 
Dakota), NA., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 231 & n.13 (2001 ). The OCC 's interpretations of its own regulations are also 
entitled to deference so long as the interpretation is not "plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation." Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center, 133 S.Ct. 1326, 1337 (2013); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
ARGUMENT 
In response to the Court's Briefing Order, the OCC responds to the Court's 
questions as follows: 1) The state in which a national bank acts in a fiduciary 
capacity is where the bank is "located" for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 92a and that 
state's law determines the fiduciary capacities in which a national bank may act in 
any state; 2) a national bank permitted to act as a foreclosure trustee under the 
laws of the state where it is "located" may act in that capacity in another state even 
though the laws of that state may provide otherwise; and 3) Twelve C.F .R. § 9. 7 is 
-7-
A-51 
Appellate Case: 12-4150 Document: 0101909ffi189l Date Filed: 07/lB/2013 Page: 14 
a pennissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a that is entitled to Chevron 
deference. 
1. Under 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d), what state does 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[] to" 
when a national bank based in one state serves as the trustee of a trust deed 
on real property located in another state?" 
The regulation makes clear that the state in which the bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity for each fiduciary relationship is where the bank is "located" 
for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 92a, and further identifies three fiduciary acts that are 
determinative of where the bank is "located" for a fiduciary relationship. They are 
the location where the bank: (1) accepted the fiduciary appointment; (2) executed 
the documents that create the fiduciary relationship; and (3) makes discretionary 
decisions regarding fiduciary assets. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d).11 
2. If the state 12 U.S.C. § 92a "refer[s] to" is not the state where the 
real property is located, may the national bank conduct a non-judicial 
foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that the state where the real property is 
located - while allowing a bank to serve as a trustee of real-property trust 
deed - permits only two types of trustees to conduct non-judicial foreclosures: 
~ Neither the state where the national bank is "based" nor the state where the 
property that is the subject of the fiduciary relationship is located is determinative of 
which state's law applies to determine eligibility to act as a fiduciary. See 12 C.F .R. 
§ 9.7(b)(national bank may act as fiduciary for relationships that include property 
located in other states.) See also Preamble, 66 P.R. at 34794-95: "[W]e disagree that 
'location' for purposes of section 92a is appropriately determined by a main office or 
bank branch. As previously discussed, the Contravention Clause of section 92a 
requires that a bank look to the laws of the state in which it acts in one or more 
fiduciary capacities in order to determine the limits on those capacities." 
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1) any active member of the state bar "who maintains a place within the state 
where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the trustee"; and 
2) title insurance companies that "actually do[] business" and maintain "bona 
fide office[s] in the state"? See Utah Code§ 57-1-21. 
Yes. A national bank otherwise authorized to exercise fiduciary powers 
under 12 U.S.C. § 92a pursuant to the laws of the state where it is "located" for 
purposes of the particular fiduciary relationship may transact business authorized 
as a result of its fiduciary status with respect to property that is the subject of the 
fiduciary relationship, even though the law of the state where the property is 
located restricts that activity to fiduciaries recognized under the law of the state 
where the property is located. See Preamble at 34793, supra ("12 U.S.C. 92a does 
not subject the exercise of a national bank's fiduciaiy powers to restrictions or 
preconditions, such as licensing requirements, under state law."). A national bank 
permitted to act as a foreclosure trustee under the laws of the state where it is 
located, here Texas, may act in that role in another state even though the laws of 
that state, here Utah, may limit eligibility to act as a fiduciary for that type of 
transaction to specific entities. We note, however, that the national bank is subject 
to Utah requirements governing the conduct of the foreclosure, including, for 
example, requirements pertaining to the notice that must be provided to the 
borrower. 
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3. Is 12 C.F .R. § 9. 7 a permissible interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 92a 
that is entitled to Chevron deference? 
Yes. Section 9. 7 is a pennissible interpretation because it falls within the 
OCC's statutory authority to promulgate regulations implementing section 92a, 
because section 92a does not have a contrary plain meaning, and because the 
interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. 
The regulation is entitled to Chevron deference because the other requirements for 
deference are also met, including the requisite formality. 
Under the Chevron line of authority, Section 9. 7 is entitled to a background 
presumption of Congressional intent: that Congress contemplates that ambiguity in 
a statute administered by an agency will "be resolved, first and foremost, by the 
agency, and [that Congress] desired the agency, rather than the courts, to possess 
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 
1863, 1868 (2013), quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), NA., 517 U.S. 
735, 740-41 (1996). Here, Supreme Court authority establishes that section 92a(a) 
is ambiguous, and does not have a plain meaning inconsistent with the OCC's 
interpretation. The operative portions of section 92a(a) make dispositive the state 
in which the national bank is "located."~ The Supreme Court has held that the 
?! The text of section 92a(a) refers to a single state. The statute authorizes the 
Comptroller to grant fiduciary powers "when not in contravention of State or local 
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term "located," as it appears in federal banking laws, has "no fixed, plain 
meaning." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 312 (2006)(national 
bank is a citizen for diversity jurisdiction purposes of the state in which its main 
office is "located."); see also id. ( collecting multiple statutory applications of 
"located.") The Court amplified: "'[L]ocated,' as its appearances in the banking 
laws reveal, * * * is a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in and 
purpose for which it is used." Id. at 318. Accordingly, section 92a does not carry 
a plain meaning that forecloses the OCC's interpretation. 
There is no other basis for withholding Chevron deference from the OCC' s 
interpretation. Section 9. 7 represents an interpretation of a provision of section 
92a that the OCC is responsible for administering. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 92aG);§.I 93a. 
Section 9.7 is a "full-dress regulation" satisfying the formality requirements for 
Chevron deference. See Smiley, supra, 517 U.S. at 741; cf United States v. Mead 
law," with reference to fiduciary powers given to national bank competitors, 
including "State banks," "under the laws of the State in which the national bank is 
located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The most natural reading of this text, and the only 
reading consistent with canons of statutory constmction and with the statutory 
purpose, is that the three references to "State" refer to the same state and not to 
different states. See Preamble, 66 F.R. at 34794. 
§! "The Comptroller of the Currency is authorized and empowered to 
promulgate such regulations as he may deem necessary to enforce compliance with 
the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the powers granted therein." 
12 U.S.C. § 92aG). 
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Corp, 533 U.S. 218,231 n.13 (2001)(OCC entitled to deference even in absence of 
formal regulations). 
Finally, Chevron Step Two is satisfied because the OCC's interpretation of 
the ambiguous statutory terms is reasonable in light of the context and purpose of 
section 92a(a). There is no suggestion that .the rulemaking was procedurally 
deficient. In response to a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the OCC received 25 
connnents, including four from state bank supervisors and one from a state bank 
supervisors' organization, which the OCC considered in promulgating the final 
rule. The OCC considered, and stated the reasons for accepting or not accepting, 
the arguments advanced by these commenters and others. See, e.g., Preamble, 66 
F.R. at 34793. 
Substantively, the rulemaking, designed to provide clarity and certainty for 
national banks' multi-state fiduciary activities, rested on the analysis contained in 
three earlier Interpretive Letters: IL 695/f 866, and 872. See Preamble, 66 F.R. at 
34792. Interpretive Letter 695 concluded that a national bank with its main office 
11 There is no inconsistency between IL 695 and section 9.7. The fact situation 
addressed in IL 695 contemplated that the bank would act in a fiduciary capacity in 
multiple states, and therefore would be subject to the laws of each of those respective 
states. IL 695 at *34 n. 7. The fact situation posed by the Court, in contrast, 
contemplates the conduct of fiduciary activities in one state with respect to property 
located in another state. The principles are applied consistently in each instance. 
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in one state may have trust offices in another state. IL 866 and IL 872 addressed, 
among other things, where a national bank is deemed to be acting in a fiduciary 
capacity for purposes of section 92a. The amended section 9. 7 codified those 
interpretations. 66 P.R. at 34792. 
As the Preamble explained in construing the text of the statute, the statutory 
grant of authority does not limit where a national bank may act in a fiduciary 
capacity, does not require that the bank's customers or the property involved in the 
fiduciary relationship be located in the same state as the bank, and does not limit a 
bank to acting in a fiduciary capacity in a single state. 66 P.R. at 34794. In the 
rulemaking, the OCC isolated three core fiduciary activities - accepting a 
fiduciary appointment, executing documents that create the fiduciary relationship, 
and making decisions regarding the investment or disttibution of assets - that 
' determine with certainty which state's laws would govern for the purpose of 
section 92a. 66 P.R. at 34794. The rulemaking also clarified the section 92a 
delineation between substantive state law governing the trust itself and federal law 
governing eligibility to act as fiduciary. 66 F.R. at 34795-96. 
The reasonableness of the OCC's conclusions is further supported by its 
consultation of the parallel conclusions reached by another agency, the then-
independent OTS. 66 F.R. at 34793 n.3. 
-13-
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Accordingly, section 9. 7 represents a careful synthesis of statutory analysis 
and policy choices, drawing heavily upon agency expertise and codifying previous 
interpretations, that is entitled to Chevron deference. 
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CONCLUSION 
The OCC appreciates the opportunity provided by the Court to comment on 
the application and validity of Section 9.7. 
JULY2013 
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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) may authorize a national bank to exercise fidu-
ciary powers "when not in contravention of State or 
local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a). The question presented 
is as follows: 
Whether the OCC has reasonably construed Sec-
tion 92a(a) as referring to the laws of the State in 
which a national bank performs certain core fiduciary 
activities. 
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FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE AsSOCIATION, 
PETITIONER 
v. 
LORAINE SUNDQUIST 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 
This brief is submitted in response to the order of 
the Court inviting the Solicitor General to express the 
views of the United States. In the view of the United 
States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
denied. 
STATEMENT 
1. The National Bank Act (Act), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 
established a system of nationally chartered banks. 
"National banks are instrumentalities of the Federal 
government, created for a public purpose, and as such 
necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the 
United States." Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 
275, 283 (1896). 
a. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) is a bureau within the Department of the 
Treasury charged with administration of the Act and 
(1) 
2 
with "superintendence of national banks." Nations-
bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 
513 U.S. 251, 254 (1995). In furtherance of that role, 
the OCC is "authorized to prescribe rules and regula-
tions to carry out the responsibilities of the office." 12 
U.S.C. 93a. 
The Act vests national banks with certain enumer-
ated powers. Among these are the power to "pur-
chase, hold, and convey real estate," including as se-
curity for and in satisfaction of debts. 12 U.S.C. 29 
(Second) and (Third); see 12 U.S.C. 371 (authorizing 
mortgage lending). The Act further provides: 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be author-
ized and empowered to grant by special permit to 
national banks applying therefor, when not in con-
travention of State or local law, the right to act as 
trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks 
and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, 
or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State 
banks, trust companies, or other corporations 
which come into competition with national banks 
are permitted to act under the laws of the State in 
which the national bank is located. 
12 U.S.C. 92a(a). 1 
1 Section 92a was originally enacted in 1913 as part of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 11 (k), 38 Stat. 262. In 1962, Congress 
removed Section 92a from the Federal Reserve Act and trans-
ferred authority from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System to the OCC. See Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L. 
No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668. Although the provision was codified at 12 
U.S.C. 92a, the 1962 statutory revision did not purport to amend 
the National Bank Act or place the provision therein. See In 're 
Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 67 (3d Cir. 1994). The 
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The Act authorizes the OCC "to promulgate such 
regulations as [it] may deem necessary to enforce 
compliance with the provisions of [Section 92a] and 
the proper exercise of the powers granted therein." 
12 U.S.C. 92a(j). The OCC has issued regulations that 
specify the requirements for a national bank to obtain 
approval to act as a fiduciary and the conditions under 
which fiduciary powers may be exercised. See 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 9. 
b. In 2001, the OCC undertook notice-and-
comment rulemaking to "address[] the application of 
12 U.S.C. 92a in the context of a national bank engag-
ing in fiduciary activities in more than one state." 66 
Fed. Reg. 34,792 (July 2, 2001). The rulemaking re-
flected advice from three prior interpretive letters in 
which the OCC had been asked by national banks to 
opine on their authority to act in a fiduciary capacity 
in multiple States and to solicit and service customers 
across state lines. Ibid. The current regulations 
provide that, if a national bank has been given ap-
proval to act as a fiduciary, it "may act in a fiduciary 
capacity in any state." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(a). The bank 
may also market fiduciary services to customers in 
other States, may act as a fiduciary for those custom-
ers, and may serve in a fiduciary capacity "for rela-
tionships that include property located in other 
states." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(b). 
As noted above, a national bank may exercise fidu-
ciary powers only "when not in contravention of State 
or local law, * * * under the laws of the State in 
which the national bank is located." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a). 
The regulations provide that, "[f]or each fiduciary 
provision is nevertheless commonly referred to as being part of 
National Bank Act, a convention followed in this brief. 
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relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the 
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for 
that relationship." 12 C.F.R. 9. 7(d). For this pur-
pose, the State in which a national bank "acts in a 
fiduciary capacity" is the State where it performs 
three core fiduciary functions: "[1] accept[ing] the 
fiduciary appointment, [2] execut[ing] the documents 
that create the fiduciary relationship, and [3] mak-
[ing] discretionary decisions" regarding the relation-
ship. Ibid. "If these activities take place in more than 
one state, then the state in which the bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state 
that the bank designates from among those states." 
Ibid. The regulations further provide that a national 
bank's fiduciary powers are subject only to "the laws 
of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary ca-
pacity." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(e)(l). All other "state laws 
limiting or establishing preconditions on the exercise 
of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national 
banks." 12 C.F.R. 9.7(e)(2). 
2. a. In 2006, respondent executed a deed of trust 
as security for a loan on her Utah property. In 2009, 
she stopped making payments on the mortgage. The 
beneficiary under the deed of trust appointed Recon-
Trust Company N .A., a national bank, as the succes-
sor trustee. In January 2011, ReconTrust gave notice 
to respondent of a planned trustee's sale of the prop-
erty. In May 2011, ReconTrust conducted a nonjudi-
cial foreclosure of the property and deeded it to peti-
tioner. Pet. App. 3a. 
Respondent remained in residence, and in June 
2011, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer action to 
take possession of the property. Pet. App. 3a. At a 
hearing to decide possession during the pendency of 
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the litigation, respondent argued that ReconTrust had 
not been authorized by Utah law to conduct the non-
judicial foreclosure. Id. at 3a, 30a-31a. Under Utah 
law, the power of sale in a nonjudicial foreclosure may 
be exercised only by active Utah State Bar members 
or by title insurance companies doing business in the 
State. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (Lex-
isNexis 2010); see id. §§ 57-1-23, 57-1-24. 
Respondent argued that the sale was invalid under 
Utah law because ReconTrust was neither a member 
of the state bar nor a title insurance company, and 
therefore was not a qualified trustee. Pet. App. 3a, 
30a-3la. In response, petitioner argued that "Recon-
Trust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct 
the sale under federal law and that federal law 
preempted the Utah statute." Id. at 2a. The district 
court ruled in favor of petitioner. Id. at 3a, 36a. 
b. The Utah Supreme Court granted respondent's 
petition for interlocutory review and stayed her evic-
tion pending appeal. Pet. App. 3a. The court focused 
on language in Section 92a that gives a national bank 
authority "to act as a trustee or in a fiduciary capacity 
'when not in contravention of [the] State [law] . . . 
in which the national bank is located.'" Id. at 10a 
(brackets in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. 92a(a)). The 
court stated that the "key inquiry under the statute is 
determining where a national bank is 'located.'" Ibid. 
The court concluded that "a national bank is located in 
the place or places[ ]where it acts or conducts busi-
ness," id. at lla, and that a bank "certainly acts as a 
trustee in the state in which it liquidates trust assets," 
id. at 12a. The court held on that basis that "Con-
gress ha[d] directly spoken to the question at issue," 
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making ReconTrust subject to the law of Utah-the 
State in which the sale was conducted. Id. at 13a. 
The Utah Supreme Court further held that, "even 
if the plain meaning of the statute were not clear," 
two "clear statement" canons of statutory construction 
would dictate the conclusion that Utah law controls. 
Pet. App. 14a; see id. at 14a-18a. Under the first 
canon, a federal statute will not be read to "pre-empt 
the historic powers of the States" absent "a clear 
statement of [Congress's] intention to do so." Id. at 
14a (quoting Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 
534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002)). Under the second canon, a 
clear statement is needed to overcome doubt "that 
Congress would leave the determination of major 
policy questions to agency discretion." Id. at 16a 
(citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120 (2000)). The court found petitioner's 
view of Section 92a, under which the "provision dele-
gates to the Comptroller the discretion to authorize 
one state to regulate the terms and conditions of a 
foreclosure sale in another state," to be inconsistent 
with both those canons of construction. Id. at 17a. 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated that, even 
if it were necessary to consider the OCC's regulation, 
the court would "find the Comptroller's current inter-
pretation of the statute * * * to be unreasonable." 
Pet. App. 18a. The court described the regulation as 
"inexplicably defin[ing] a bank's 'location' as the place 
where it engages in three specific activities," namely, 
the three core fiduciary functions specified in 12 
C.F.R. 9.7(d). Pet. App. 19a. The court found "noth-
ing in the statute itself that ascribes any particular 
significance [to] these three particular acts," which 
"could theoretically be performed in any location 
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without regard to the location of the trust property." 
Ibid. 
Having concluded that the Act did not preempt 
Utah law, the Utah Supreme Court reserved judg-
ment on all other issues. Pet. App. 23a. The court 
remanded the case to the district court, where "the 
parties are free to raise any arguments they may have 
regarding the validity of the foreclosure sale and 
trustee's deed and the appropriateness of the order of 
restitution." Ibid. 
Justice Lee filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. Justice Lee disagreed 
with the majority's conclusion that the statute was 
unambiguous as to the meaning of "located." Pet. 
App. 24a-27a. He nevertheless agreed that Utah law 
governed ReconTrust's fiduciary powers, based on the 
first clear-statement rule relied upon by the majority 
-"that on a matter of traditional state sovereignty 
over the disposition of title to property of an inherent-
ly local nature, [a court should not] lightly deem Con-
gress to have intruded on the local state's sovereign-
ty." Id. at 27a. 
DISCUSSION 
Although the decision below is incorrect, the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied. Two 
serious jurisdictional obstacles would likely prevent 
the Court from reaching the merits if it granted re-
view in this case. And while the decision below is in 
substantial tension with an unpublished decision of the 
Tenth Circuit, it does not squarely conflict with any 
published appellate decision. 
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A. The Utah Supreme Court's Interlocutory Decision Is 
Not A "Final Judgment" Over Which This Court Has 
Jurisdiction 
This Court's jurisdiction to review state-court deci-
sions is limited to "[f]inal judgments or decrees ren-
dered by the highest court of a State in which a deci-
sion could be had." 28 U.S.C. 1257(a). That provision 
"establishes a firm final judgment rule." Jefferson v. 
City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 81 (1997). "To be re-
viewable by this Court, a state-court judgment must 
be final 'in two senses: it must be subject to no fur-
ther review or correction in any other state tribunal; it 
must also be final as an effective determination of the 
litigation and not of merely interlocutory or interme-
diate steps therein. It must be the final word of a final 
court."' Ibid. (quoting Market St. Ry. v. Railroad 
Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945)). 
The Utah Supreme Court's avowedly "interlocuto-
ry" (Pet. App. 3a) decision in this case did not finally 
determine or terminate the litigation. Based on its 
conclusion that the district court had incorrectly re-
solved the preemption issue, the Utah Supreme Court 
"vacate[d] the district court's order of restitution and 
remand[ed] for additional proceedings." Id. at 2a. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that the parties 
had "raise[ d] a variety of other issues relating to the 
validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the validity 
of the trustee's deed, and the propriety of the order of 
restitution." Id. at 23a. Those issues remain to be 
resolved in the first instance by the district court on 
remand. Id. at 23a-24a. 
This case does not fall "within the 'limited set of 
situations in which [this Court has] found finality as to 
the federal issue despite the ordering of further pro-
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ceedings in the lower state courts.'" Jefferson, 522 
U.S. at 82; see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975). Of the four Cox Broadcasting categories, see 
id. at 477-483, the one most arguably relevant here is 
the fourth, which includes cases in which "reversal of 
the state court on the federal issue would be preclu-
sive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of 
action," id. at 482-483. The present case, however, 
does not appear to meet that description. Even if this 
Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed the 
Utah Sµpreme Court's non-preemption holding, re-
spondent might nevertheless prevail on one of her 
remaining defenses. 
Several of those defenses appear to be tied to the 
question whether ReconTrust was "authorized" under 
Utah law to conduct the foreclosure sale. See Resp. 
Utah S. Ct. Br., 2011 WL 11556544, at *12-*16 (Nov. 
3, 2011). That question would become moot if this 
Court granted review and held that Utah law did not 
govern ReconTrust's authority to foreclose. But re-
spondent's other defenses to foreclosure, left unre-
solved by the Utah Supreme Court, would require 
resolution even if the federal issue were decided in 
petitioner's favor. See Resp. Utah S. Ct. Reply Br., 
2012 WL 10194574, at *7 n.5 (July 27, 2012) (arguing 
that petitioner was not the beneficiary of the trust 
deed at the time of the foreclosure sale and therefore 
was not in a position to make a credit bid for the prop-
erty). Because reversal of the Utah Supreme Court's 
ruling would not "be preclusive of any further litiga-
tion" regarding the validity of the foreclosure, Cox 
Broad., 420 U.S. at 482-483, the decision below is not a 
"final judgment" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
1257(a). 
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B. A Substantial Question Exists As To The Timeliness 
Of The Petition 
Under 28 U.S.C. 2101(c), absent an extension of 
time, a petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed 
"within ninety days after the entry of * * * judg-
ment," a requirement that this Court has described as 
"mandatory and jurisdictional." Missouri v. Jenkins, 
495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990). In this case, the Utah Supreme 
Court's judgment was entered on July 23, 2013, Pet. 
App. la, making the petition due on October 21. Be-
cause petitioner waited until December 2 to seek an 
extension of time in which to file, respondent argues 
(Br. in Opp. 1-2, 6-7) that the petition is untimely. 
Petitioner contends (Reply Br. 2-3) that the 90-day 
filing ·period did not begin to run until the Utah Su-
preme Court denied its petition for rehearing on Sep-
tember 16, 2013. Under this Court's rules, if a rehear-
ing petition is timely filed, or if the lower court "ap-
propriately entertains" an untimely rehearing peti-
tion, the 90-day period for seeking this Court's review 
begins to run when the lower court disposes of the 
rehearing petition. Sup. Ct. R. 13.3. Petitioner's 
rehearing petition in the Utah Supreme Court was 
apparently untimely, since it was filed three days 
beyond the 14-day period allowed under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 35(a). 2 Pet. App. 41a-43a. Peti-
tioner argues (Reply Br. 2-3) that the Utah Supreme 
Court nevertheless entertained the rehearing petition 
because (1) the petition was received and circulated to 
the court, despite the rule that an untimely rehearing 
petition "will not be received by the clerk," Utah R. 
2 Petitioner "maintains that the rehearing petition was timely" 
(Reply Br. 3) but does not state the basis for that claim. 
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App. P. 35(d); (2) the court denied the petition rather 
than dismissing it, employing language in its order 
similar to language used to deny timely petitions; and 
(3) the court declined to act on respondent's motion to 
strike the rehearing petition as untimely, and it has 
not acted on respondent's request to clarify that the 
petition was denied as untimely. According to peti-
tioner, this treatment of the rehearing petition shows 
that the petition was "assuredly 'entertain[ed]' by the 
court below." Reply Br. 3 (brackets in original). 
Although this Court has not precisely defined the 
term "appropriately entertains" in Supreme Court 
Rule 13.3, two of its precedents provide guidance. In 
Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), the 90-day clock 
was deemed reset by a tardy rehearing petition when 
the court of appeals had granted permission to file a 
late petition, had treated it as timely, and had delayed 
issuance of its mandate until the petition was denied. 
Id. at 147 n.l. In Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), 
"[t]he Court of Appeals, on its own motion, recalled its 
mandate and ordered the parties to brief the question 
whether the case should be reheard en bane." Id. at 
97. As this Court explained, the court of appeals' 
briefing order in Hibbs, like the decision in Young to 
entertain the untimely petition, shared a "key charac-
teristic" with a timely rehearing petition: "All three 
raise the question whether the court will modify the 
judgment and alter the parties' rights." Id. at 98. 
Thus, in both Young and Hibbs, the courts of ap-
peals had expressly indicated, in orders issued before 
the ultimate denials of rehearing, that they would 
consider on the merits whether the cases should be 
reheard. To be sure, no decision of this Court holds 
that the circumstances identified by petitioner are 
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insufficient to restart the 90-day deadline for filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. To accept the certio-
rari petition as timely in the present circumstances, 
however, would substantially expand Supreme Court 
Rule 13.3 beyond past practice. 
C. The OCC Has Reasonably Interpreted Section 92a As 
Applying The Law Of The State In Which A National 
Bank Performs Certain Core Fiduciary Functions 
Section 92a permits a national bank, when author-
ized by the OCC, to exercise fiduciary powers "when 
not in contravention of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. 
92a(a). The OCC has reasonably interpreted that 
language, and the other references to "State" in Sec-
tion 92a, as ref erring to the State in which a national 
bank performs certain core fiduciary functions. Un-
der the OCC's approach, a national bank that per-
forms those functions in one State must comply with 
that State's law (and only with that State's law), even 
if the trust property is located in another State. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that, at least in cases in-
volving the sale of real property, the national bank's 
authority to perform trust functions must instead be 
determined under the law of the State where the 
property is located. That holding is incorrect. 
1. "National banks are instrumentalities of the 
Federal government," Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 
U.S. 275, 283 (1896), and they possess the powers 
conferred on them by federal law. The OCC may 
authorize a national bank to act as a fiduciary, 12 
U.S.C. 92a(a), and it is undisputed that ReconTrust 
received such authorization. The question is whether 
ReconTrust's exercise of federally granted fiduciary 
authority in the circumstances of this case would be 
"in contravention of State or local law." Ibid. 
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In the various National Bank Act provisions that 
refer to state law, "the references to state laws occur 
in conjunction with references to, or descriptions of, 
the national bank's acting in a fiduciary capacity." 
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 5 (Oct. 8, 1999). 3 
The most logical inference, and the one drawn by the 
OCC, is that the statute uses the term "State"-
including in Section 92a(a)'s phrase "the State in 
which the national bank is located"-to mean the 
"state where it acts in a fiduciary capacity." Id. at 6. 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
§ 101, 108 Stat. 2339, which permitted national banks 
to establish branch offices across state lines. That 
change in the legal regime, combined with "new tech-
nologies that greatly facilitate[d] the marketing and 
delivery of fiduciary services to customers nation-
wide," produced an "increase in national banks' inter-
state fiduciary operations." 65 Fed. Reg. 75,875 (Dec. 
5, 2000). As a result, the OCC received questions from 
national banks about their authority to perform fidu-
ciary activities in, and on behalf of customers from, 
multiple States, as well as questions about the law 
that would apply to those activities. See OCC Inter-
pretive Ltr. No. 872 (Oct. 28, 1999)4; OCC Interpretive 
Ltr. No. 866; OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 695 (Dec. 8, 
1995). 5 
The OCC accordingly initiated a rulemaking to 
"address[] the application of 12 U.S.C. 92a in the con-
3 Available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-
precedents/oct99/int866. pdf. 
4 Available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-
precedents/ dec99/int872. pdf. 
5 Available at 1995 WL 788085. 
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text of a national bank engaging in fiduciary activities 
in more than one state." 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792. "The 
purpose of the rulemaking was to provide clarity and 
certainty for national banks' multi-state fiduciary 
activities." Ibid. After soliciting and reviewing public 
comments, the OCC promulgated regulations, now 
codified at 12 C.F.R. 9.7, to govern "Multi-state fidu-
ciary operations." 
The regulations confirm that a national bank, 
"[w]hile acting in a fiduciary capacity in one state, 
* * * [may] act as fiduciary for[] customers located 
in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relation-
ships that include property located in other states." 
12 C.F.R. 9. 7(b). The regulations further provide 
that, "[f]or each fiduciary relationship, the state re-
ferred to in section 92a is the state in which the bank 
acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship." 12 
C.F.R. 9.7(d). 
To determine where a national bank "acts in a fidu-
ciary capacity," the regulations follow the approach 
that the OCC had outlined in its prior interpretive 
advice. 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792. That advice had con-
cluded that "the best construction of the statute" was 
to define the location of fiduciary activity as "the place 
at which the bank performs core functions of a fiduci-
ary." OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. A fiduci-
ary's "core functions include accepting the appoint-
ment, executing the documents that create the fiduci-
ary relationship, and making decisions regarding the 
investment or distribution of fiduciary assets." Ibid.; 
see 12 C.F.R. 9.7(d) (similar). Under widely accepted 
principles of trust law, those "core functions" consti-
tute essential features of a fiduciary relationship: its 
establishment, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
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§ 169 (1959) (trustee's duty to administer trust begins 
"[u]pon acceptance of the trust by the trustee"); its 
scope, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 76(1) 
(2007) ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust 
* * * in accordance with the terms of the trust."); 
and its proper administration, see id. § 87 cmt. a 
("The most important of the discretionary powers in 
most trusts are those having to do with various as-
pects of the investment function, together with, in 
many trusts, those having to do with discretionary 
distributions."). 
The OCC has also noted that its "core functions" 
approach is "consistent with [the] analysis employed 
by the courts and the OCC in other situations." OCC 
Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. For instance, federal 
law permits a national bank to charge interest "at the 
rate allowed by the laws of the State * * * where 
the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. 85. For purposes of 
that provision, a national bank that issues credit cards 
is not "located" wherever its customers reside or 
make their credit card purchases, which "would make 
the meaning of [the] term 'located' too uncertain." 
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6 (citing Marquette 
Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 
299, 311-313 (1978)). Similarly, a national bank's au-
thority to operate a branch, see 12 U.S.C. 36, depends 
on where "certain key bank activities" occur, not on 
the location of the bank's interactions with customers. 
OCC Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 6. To tie a bank's 
fiduciary powers to the location of its customers 
therefore "would be fundamentally inconsistent with 
how national banks are permitted to exercise other 
authorized powers." Id~ at 7. 
A-84 
16 
The OCC's core-functions approach to determining 
the location of a national bank's fiduciary activities 
thus is consistent with trust-law principles, with other 
parts of the Act, and with the realities of modern 
banking. It therefore is a "permissible construction of 
the statute" by the agency charged with its enforce-
ment, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984), and should accordingly be given def-
erence, see Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 
735, 739 (1996) ("The Comptroller of the Currency 
* * * is charged with the enforcement of banking 
laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of the 
rule of deference with respect to his deliberative con-
clusions as to the meaning of these laws.") (citation, 
quotation marks, and brackets omitted). 
2. The Utah Supreme Court held that its own read-
ing of Section 92a was compelled by the "plain mean-
ing" of the statute, Pet. App. 10a-13a, and that the 
OCC's regulation was unreasonable, id. at 18a-21a. 
The court also held that its view was compelled by two 
"clear statement" canons of statutory interpretation. 
Id. at 14a-18a. Those holdings are erroneous. 
a. This Court has recognized that "the term 'locat-
ed,' as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no 
fixed, plain meaning." Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. 
Schmidt, 546 ·u.S. 303, 313 (2006); see id. at 318 
("'[L]ocated,' as its appearances in the banking laws 
reveal, * * * is a chameleon word; its meaning 
depends on the context in and purpose for which it is 
used."). In using such a plastic term, "Congress 
* * * understood that the ambiguity would be 
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency." Smiley, 
517 U.S. at 740-741. 
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The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] national 
bank is located in those places where it acts or con-
ducts business." Pet. App. 12a. By itself, that state-
ment is not logically inconsistent with the OCC's de-
termination that a bank is "located" in the State 
where it performs enumerated fiduciary activities. 
The court went astray, however, in concluding that, 
when a national bank sells trust assets as a trustee, it 
"acts or conducts business" only in the State where 
the property is located. Ibid. 
Because Section 92a refers to "the State in which 
the national bank is located," 12 U.S.C. 92a(a) (em-
phasis added), the most natural inference is that the 
laws of a single State will apply to the management of 
a particular trust. Because a single trust may contain 
property located in several different States, the Utah 
Supreme Court's property-based rule could subject a 
national bank's conduct of a single fiduciary relation-
ship to the laws of several different States-a result 
that could "throw into confusion the complex system 
of modern interstate banking." Marquette Nat'l 
Bank, 439 U.S. at 312. The OCC's core-functions ap-
proach, by contrast, means that for each fiduciary 
relationship, there is only "one state in which [a na-
tional bank] acts in a fiduciary capacity for purposes 
of 12 U.S.C. 92a." 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792-34,793; see 
id. at 34,795 (recognizing the need "to simplify the 
determination of where a bank with multi-state opera-
tions is acting in a fiduciary capacity"). 
b. The Utah Supreme Court also erred in holding 
that its interpretation of the statute was compelled by 
two "clear statement" canons of statutory construc-
tion. Pet. App. 14a-18a. 
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i. The presumption against construing statutes to 
"alter the usual , constitutional balance between the 
States and the Federal Government," Pet. 14a (cita-
tion omitted), has no application here. Because na-
tional banks derive their authority from federal law, 
the scope of that authority is presumed to be set by 
federal law and to preempt any inconsistent state law. 
"[I]n the context of national bank legislation, * * * 
grants of both enumerated and incidental 'powers' to 
national banks as grants of authority [are] not normal-
ly limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empt[], contra-
ry state law." Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996). "[W]here Congress 
has not expressly conditioned the grant of 'power' 
upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordi-
narily found that no such condition applies." Id. at 34. 
In any event, the aCC's core-functions approach 
"does not mean that national banks may engage in 
fiduciary activities free from state-imposed re-
strictions. Rather, [it] simply identifies which state's 
laws will apply." ace Interpretive Ltr. No. 866, at 7. 
The regulations thus provide much-needed "clarity 
and certainty for national banks' multi-state fiduciary 
activities," 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792, while preserving an 
appropriate role for state law. 
ii. Any presumption against delegating "major 
questions of policy" to an agency, Pet. App. 16a (quo-
tation marks omitted), would be similarly inapplicable 
here. Section 92a authorizes the ace "to grant [fidu-
ciary powers] by special permit to national banks 
applying therefor, when not in contravention of State 
or local law." 12 U.S.C. 92a(a). The statute itself thus 
resolves the "major questions of policy," by making 
clear both that national banks may exercise fiduciary 
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powers and that they must do so in compliance with 
state law. 
Although the statute does~ not set forth a standard 
for determining which State's law will apply to a par-
ticular fiduciary activity (beyond indicating that it is 
"the State in which the national bank is located," 12 
U.S.C. 92a(a)), Congress's intent to vest the OCC with 
interpretive authority on this interstitial question is 
beyond reasonable dispute. Section 92a empowers the 
OCC "to promulgate such regulations as [it] may 
deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provi-
sions of this section and the proper exercise of the 
powers granted therein." 12 U.S.C. 92a(j). Identify-
ing the State whose laws will govern particular fiduci-
ary activities is undoubtedly a prerequisite to deter-
mining whether a national bank has "proper[ly] exer-
cise[ d]" its fiduciary authority. See Br. in Opp. 8-10. 
c. The Utah Supreme Court suggested that, under 
the OCC's core-functions approach, "a national bank 
based in Texas . . . would have a competitive ad-
vantage over a national bank based in Utah as well as 
Utah-chartered banks." Pet. App. 21a (citation and 
brackets omitted). It is true that, under the OCC's 
approach, some national banks may exercise fiduciary 
powers with respect to property located in Utah in 
circumstances where a Utah bank would be unable to. 
That potential disparity, however, is merely the con-
sequence of the "national banking system" that "Con-
gress intended to facilitate." Marquette Nat'l Bank, 
439 U.S. at 314-315 (citation omitted). 
In Marquette National Bank, this Court interpret-
ed a provision of the Act that authorized national 
banks to charge interest "at the rate allowed by the 
laws of the State in which the bank is 'located."' 439 
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U.S. at 308 (quoting 12 U.S.C. 85). The Court read 
that language as authorizing a national bank located in 
Nebraska to issue credit cards to Minnesota residents 
at interest rates that were consistent with Nebraska 
law but were in excess of the rates permitted by Min-
nesota's usury laws. Id. at 313-314. The Court reject-
ed the argument, made by a bank subject to Minneso-
ta law, that this result would "upset[] the competitive 
equality now existing between state and national 
banks." Id. at 314. The Court observed that "such 
inequalities" were a "necessary part" of the "system 
of interstate banking" that Congress had created. 
Ibid. Substantially the same analysis applies here. 
D. The Decision Below Is In Substantial Tension, Though 
Not In Direct Conflict, With An Unpublished Decision 
Of The Tenth Circuit 
Petitioner contends (Pet. 28-30) that the decision 
below conflicts with the Tenth Circuit's decision in 
Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., 546 Fed. Appx. 736 (2013). 
Although substantial tension exists between the two 
decisions, the two are not squarely in conflict. 
In Garrett, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
national bank had conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure 
sale of his Utah residence in violation of Utah law. 
564 Fed. Appx. at 737. The plaintiff "argue[d] that 
Section 92a, by its plain language, dictates that Utah 
law, not Texas law, applied to the foreclosure sale of 
[his] residence." Id. at 738. The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that Section 92a is ambiguous because it "pro-
vides no direction as to the critical question: in which 
'State' is the national bank 'located' where, as here, 
activities related to the foreclosure sale occur in more 
than one state?" Ibid. The court accordingly resolved 
the case based on the OCC's regulations, as well as on 
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statements made by the ace in a brief filed at the 
invitation of the court in another case, Dutcher v. 
Matheson, 733 F .3d 980 (10th Cir. 2013). 6 See Gar-
rett, 546 Fed. Appx. at 739-7 42. 
The Tenth Circuit in Garrett granted the parties 
leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in this case. 546 Fed. Appx. 
at 739 n.l. The court ultimately declined, however, to 
resolve the plaintiff's challenge to the validity of the 
pertinent ace regulation because that challenge had 
not been raised in a timely manner. Ibid.; see id. at 
739 (explaining that, because the plaintiff had timely 
"raise[d] arguments only as. to the meaning of [the 
pertinent ace rule], and not to the reasonableness of 
the regulations themselves," the court would "limit 
[its] inquiry accordingly"). Because the Tenth Circuit 
expressly reserved the question whether the ace 
regulation is valid, no square conflict between the two 
decisions exists. And because the decision in Garrett 
is nonprecedential, the question presented here re-
mains open within the Tenth Circuit. There is sub-
stantial tension between the two decisions, however, 
because the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that Section 
92a(a) is ambiguous is logically irreconcilable with the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding that "the plain mean-
ing of the statute" compels application of Utah law. 
Pet. App. 12a. 7 
6 In Dutcher, the Tenth Circuit remanded for further proceed-
ings to determine whether the district court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction, without addressing the preemption issue presented 
here. See 733 F.3d at 983,990. 
7 Petitioner also suggests (Pet. 29-30) that the decision below 
conflicts with the Fourth Circuit's decision in J aldin v. ReconTrust 
Co., 539 Fed. Appx. 97 (2013) (per curiam), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
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E. Although The Question Presented Will Likely War-
rant This Court's Review In An Appropriate Case, This 
Is Not A Suitable Vehicle 
The OCC's regulations constitute an integral part 
of the national banking system, on which national 
banks rely to determine their authority and legal 
obligations. See Clearing House Ass'n Amicus Br. 8 
("National banks rely heavily on the OCC's interstate 
fiduciary regulations to provide fiduciary services on 
an interstate basis to their customers, wherever such 
customers, and their property, happen to be locat-
ed."). The ruling below significantly undermines the 
"clarity and certainty" that the OCC regulations are 
designed to achieve. 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,792. 
In light of the jurisdictional obstacles identified 
above (see pp. 8-12, supra), however, this case is not a 
suitable vehicle for resolution of the question present-
ed. And because the Utah Supreme Court is the only 
appellate court that has squarely addressed a chal-
lenge to the validity of the OCC rule at issue here, this 
Court's resolution of the question presented might 
benefit from further consideration of the issue in the 
lower courts. The Court therefore should wait to 
address the issue in an appropriate case. 
2293 (2014). The court in Jaldin held that Section 92a preempted 
a Virginia statute that granted certain fiduciary powers to "state 
banks, but not national banks that do not have their principal office 
in Virginia." Id. at 101. Because Utah law does not permit state 
banks to conduct nonjudicial foreclosures, the J aldin court's 
primary rationale for finding preemption is inapplicable here. 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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